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Mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions for social anxiety incorporate 
techniques such as self-compassion and values articulations. Self-compassion has been 
shown to reduce anticipatory anxiety in students with high social anxiety but the impact 
of values-affirmation has not yet been explored. Additionally, past research suggests that 
values-affirmation may foster self-compassion. Three studies were conducted to explore 
whether values-affirmation, too, reduces anticipatory anxiety (related to an upcoming 
speech task) and to evaluate whether self-compassion is a mechanism of change. In study 
one, participants (N = 93) were randomly assigned to a self-compassion manipulation, a 
values-affirmation condition, or a control condition. After controlling for baseline 
differences, there were no significant differences across conditions on anticipatory 
anxiety. Study two (N =121) compared a standard values-affirmation (in the context of a 
memorable experience) to the modified values-affirmation (in the context of a mistake) 
used in study one and determined the values-affirmation used was not representative of a 
typical values-affirmation manipulation. The purpose of study three (N = 209) was to 
compare a standard values-affirmation manipulation and control group on their levels of 
anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task. Participants were preselected for 
high versus low social anxiety to compare these groups. The results showed that self-
affirmation reduced anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety only, and this 
effect was mediated by state self-compassion. This research further supports the self-
compassion account of self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014) and adds to the 
literature showing that individual vulnerability differences can serve as a significant 
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Reducing Anticipatory Anxiety: Does Values-affirmation Increase Self-Compassion 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common and persistent anxiety disorder 
(Beedso-Baum et al., 2012; Baxter et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2012) associated with many 
problematic outcomes (Beesdo et al., 2007; Mullaney & Trippet, 1979, Liebowitz et al., 
1985). Mindfulness and acceptance-based interventions (MABI) show growing support for 
treating people with SAD (Stefan et al., 2018; Norton et al., 2015; Dalrymple & Herbert, 
2007; Kocovski et al., 2013), and have been suggested as an alternative treatment option 
for anxiety disorders (see Keng et al., 2011 for review; Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Eifert et al., 
2009). Rather than trying to alter negative cognitions and emotions directly as in traditional 
cognitive behavioural interventions, MABIs place an emphasis on encouraging behavioral 
shifts in the face of cognitive or emotional distress (Herbert et al., 2014). 
The current research focuses on two techniques from within the mindfulness- and 
acceptance-based camp that may be helpful for the treatment of SAD: 1) self-compassion 
(SC), which is derived from Buddhism and mindfulness, and 2) values articulation, which 
will be represented through a values-affirmation task borrowed from the self-affirmation 
literature. Inducing self-compassion has been found to effectively reduce anticipatory 
anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). The main purpose 
of the current research was to determine whether, like self-compassion, values-affirmation 
is effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety, and whether self-compassion plays a 
mediating role, such that values-affirmation increases self-compassion, which in turn 
decreases anticipatory anxiety.  
Social Anxiety  
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 Social anxiety disorder (SAD), formerly known as social phobia, is recognized by 
the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) as fear and avoidance of 
social situations due to possible negative evaluation from others. It is characterized by 
persistent and irrational fears of being judged by others, specifically in three circumstances: 
public speaking or performances (typically the most distressing), social interactions (e.g. 
speaking with a stranger), and being observed in public (e.g. eating).   
Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995) connect social anxiety with three 
key attributes: 1) a tendency to focus on negative social information (i.e. criticism), 2) 
perfectionistic standards in social performance settings, and 3) a high degree of public self-
consciousness. Not only do individuals with SAD interpret neutral social events as negative 
and indicative of their shortcomings, but they also have a memory bias in favor of this 
interpretation bias (Hertel et al., 2008; Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008). Overall, people with 
SAD have a biased tendency to recall emotionally negative events. 
People with SAD are markedly self-conscious in public settings and preoccupied 
with a need to appear perfect and have flawless interactions (Flett et al., 2012). When they 
are treated negatively by others, this memory consumes their thoughts (Nepon et al., 2011). 
Importantly, people with high levels of social anxiety are also known to be more self-
critical (Cox et al., 2002), which has been found to be a predictor of poorer response to 
CBT (Rector et al., 2000). In fact, the fundamental main thematic fear in SAD is that “the 
self is deficient” (Moscovitch, 2009). Individuals with high social anxiety attach less 
importance to their positive characteristics (Moscovitch et al., 2009) and have a more 
negative self-view, even when they have performed objectively well in a given social 
situation (Alden & Wallace, 1995). Cox et al. (2004) found self-criticism to be significantly 
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associated with lifetime occurrence of social anxiety disorder, even after controlling for 
current levels of emotional distress, mood, anxiety, substance use disorders, depression, 
and trait levels of neuroticism. Their study was conducted with clinical samples, 
characterized by demoralization, distress and perceived need for help; however, they 
determined that the presence of social anxiety disorder alone was enough to account for the 
heightened levels of self-criticism that were observed. In line with this, people with social 
anxiety disorder have also been shown to display higher scores in fear of self-compassion 
and of receiving compassion compared to a control group (Merrit & Purdon, 2020).  
Data from Ontario’s Mental Health Supplement study found that SAD was 
connected to clear dissatisfaction and low functioning in terms of quality of life (Stein & 
Kean, 2000). It is also associated with dropping out of school (Stein & Kean, 2000), and 
with an increased risk of depressive disorders, substance-use disorders, and cardiovascular 
disease (Ruscio et al., 2008; Kessler, 2003). There are high comorbidity rates with other 
mental disorders in general, ranging between 69% and 99% (Chartier et al., 2003; 
Leichsenring et al., 2003; Schneier et al, 1992). People with SAD have lower positive 
functioning (Weeks & Heimberg, 2012), experience fewer positive emotions, less meaning 
in life, and lower self-esteem (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013). They perceive themselves to 
face more difficulties and failures and report lower intrinsic motivation in working toward 
their purpose (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013).  
Importantly, SAD is associated with a lowered tendency to seek help (Ruscio et al., 
2008; Kessler, 2003; Keller, 2003, Beesdo et al., 2007). According to a study done by 
Ranta et al. (2009), only 1 in 5 adolescents with SAD had sought out help from a mental 
health professional. Other studies have reported numbers as low as 5% of people with SAD 
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seeking adequate help (Weiller et al., 1996). Naturally, social anxiety hinders help-seeking 
behaviours from those with SAD as they likely experience heightened concerns about 
social evaluation from both healthcare professionals, and peers. Clark (2001) has noted that 
a key issue for those with SAD is an excessive internal self-focus which magnifies their 
belief that others will reject them if they were to not behave properly. When people with 
SAD do seek out therapy, a notable barrier is client motivation. McAleavey et al. (2014) 
found that 60.5% of clinicians agreed that when client motivation was lower at the start of 
therapy, they were less likely to thrive through cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). CBT is 
the typical treatment for SAD (Kaczkurzin, 2015); however, after incorporating high drop-
out rates (about 10-20%), about half of patients show minimal, if any, response to treatment 
(Eskildsen et al., 2010) and most continue to experience lingering symptoms after CBT 
(Rodebaugh et al, 2004; Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007). Occasionally, clients in CBT even 
show worse symptoms (McAleavey et al., 2014). 
Perhaps self-help approaches that aim to adjust the way they view themselves 
(lower self-criticism) as well as manipulate their focus of attention, such as mindful 
exercises and workbooks (Fleming & Kocovski, 2013), would be a useful tactic to offer 
strategies for this population. Further, McAleavey et al. (2014) suggest incorporating 
techniques that would improve client motivation. For example, incorporating values work 
could help to improve client motivation (Grumet & Fitzpatrick, 2016), as personal values 
are innately motivating (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).  
Mindfulness and Acceptance Based Interventions 
Mindfulness has received significant attention in recent years; in fact, this has been 
referred to as the “Mindfulness Revolution” and it has been described as being the secret to 
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happiness (Pickert, 2014). The “third-wave” mindfulness- and acceptance-based 
interventions emphasize present-focused awareness in which the individual views their 
current experience(s) with acceptance and compassion, rather than engaging in avoidance, 
control, or suppression (Hayes, 2004; Williams, 2010). For example, in the context of 
anxiety disorders, mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions aim to facilitate 
observation of symptomatic processes (e.g. increased heartrate or sweaty hands) without 
overidentifying with said processes and reacting to them in ways that are more destructive 
than helpful (e.g. avoidance; Roemer et al., 2008). A common example of an exercise used 
in mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions is awareness of breathing. The task is 
to simply focus on the physical sensation of one’s own breath, and if attention drifts to 
external stimuli or thought, then the task is to redirect one’s focus on breathing once again.  
Mindfulness meditation has been incorporated into larger behavioral interventions 
for those experiencing anxiety disorders and shows promising results, with people having 
lower levels of anxiety symptoms as well as higher quality of life (Chen et al., 2012; 
Khoury et al., 2013; Serpa et al., 2014).  Mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions 
also show promising results for treating people with SAD (Goldin et al., 2009; Bogels et 
al., 2006), and acceptance and commitment therapy, a type of mindfulness- and 
acceptance-based intervention, has been found to be equally effective as CBT in both group 
and individual settings (Kocovski et al., 2013; Craske et al., 2014). These therapies 
emphasize the acceptance of internal experiences, as well as values articulation and values-
consistent action (Hayes et al., 2012).   
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), a type of MABI, focuses on 
psychological flexibility, defined as “the ability to contact the present moment more fully 
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as a conscious human being, and to either change or persist when doing so serves valued 
ends” (Hayes et al., 2004, p. 5). There are six processes involved in psychological 
flexibility: 1) acceptance (willingness to have private internal experiences, as opposed to 
avoiding one’s thoughts and feelings); 2) cognitive defusion (not allowing literal language 
to dominate the direct experience, as opposed to being “fused” to a certain thought or 
belief, such as “I am a failure”); 3) contact with the present moment (maintaining 
awareness and focus on the current moment, as opposed to ruminating on the past or 
worrying about the future); 4) self-as-context (maintaining a flexible view of one’s self 
based on the context); 5) values (awareness of things that are important to you and that help 
direct your actions) and 6) committed action (similar to values; involves the articulation of 
firm behaviors that will help to move an individual toward their values, as opposed to 
inaction, impulsivity or avoidance), all of which are believed to initiate change during 
treatment (Ruiz, 2012). Along with acceptance, values are leaned on heavily in acceptance 
and commitment therapy.  
Although CBT is the ‘gold standard’ for treating anxiety disorders, mindfulness- 
and acceptance-based therapies offer a promising alternative treatment option for some 
people. Studies on acceptance and commitment therapy have shown growing evidence for 
treating a wide range of psychological issues, including anxiety disorders (Craske et al., 
2014; Swain et al., 2013; Ruiz, 2010 for review). Open trials investigating ACT in both 
individual and group settings for SAD have shown significant improvement in social 
anxiety symptoms and quality of life (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007) and significant 
decreases in experiential avoidance (Ossman et al., 2006). Internet-delivered ACT 
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programs have even shown to be effective in reducing social anxiety symptoms (Ivanova et 
al., 2016).  
Although there is growing empirical support for mindfulness- and acceptance-based 
therapies, they are not always effective, especially when one is specifically looking to 
minimize one’s symptoms of anxiety (Strauss et al., 2014). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT) suggests that forming a connection with personal values can motivate 
people intrinsically to build mindfulness-skills (Hayes et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011). 
ACT has a core process of “committed action”, requiring engagement in activities that 
align with personal values. There is supporting evidence for the values component in ACT 
benefitting people experiencing anxiety disorders, showing it to be helpful in lowering 
psychological distress and enhancing well-being and quality of life (Michelson et al., 
2011).  Michelson et al. had participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) undergo 
acceptance-based behavioural therapy (ABBT), during which they were encouraged to 
discuss the values that are central to them and to think about how anxiety and avoidance 
behaviours have impeded values consistent living. The researchers determined that ABBT 
lead to significant increases in valued living. Research on values, such as that done by 
Michelson et al., typically looks at the effect of values articulation on values-consistent 
activities. It is not clear, however, whether values clarification tasks have a significant 
impact (e.g., West et al., 2013; Berghoff et al., 2017) outside of value-related behaviors 
(Karremans, 2007; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001).  This was considered in the current 
studies, by borrowing a values-affirmation task from the self-affirmation literature to 
explore whether writing about an important value reduces anticipatory anxiety towards an 
unrelated upcoming speech task. 
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Values 
 In acceptance and commitment therapy, values are defined as “…verbally-
constructed, globally-desired life directions” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 235). Unlike goals, 
values have no ‘end’; they help guide behavior in an ongoing process. They are meant to 
orient people toward purposeful actions, even when they are experiencing negative 
emotions (Hayes et al., 2012). Identifying values in therapy has been found to increase 
values-oriented behaviors (Yadavia & Hayes, 2009; Chase et al., 2013, Paez-Blarrina et al, 
2008). There is also literature from other areas of psychology showing that identifying and 
exploring one’s personal values has the ability to alter behavior and attitude (Epton et al., 
2014; Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Harris & Epton, 2009; Lehmiller et al., 2010).  
A technique used in acceptance-based behavioural therapies is a values articulation, 
in which clients are encouraged to bring important values to the forefront of their mind 
when approaching challenging situations, rather than focusing on their anxiety related to 
the situation. Values clarification tasks provide a source of inspiration and life purpose 
(Hayes & Duckworth, 2006), and aim to motivate behavior and encourage acceptance in 
the presence of painful emotions and experiences (Hayes et al., 1999). A lack of values 
clarity can impede value-guided living and is related to a variety of negative outcomes, 
including suicidal ideation, experiential avoidance, general psychological distress, and 
anxiety (Bahraini et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2010). Values are suggested to offer a more 
stable “compass reading” than internal experiences (Hayes et al., 1999) when guiding 
behavior in personally relevant domains. For example, consider a situation in which 
somebody with high social anxiety is deciding whether to give a presentation. It may be 
more beneficial to consider one’s values about learning and education or personal growth 
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and development, than to base one’s decision on the anxious feelings (internal experiences) 
that arise from the thought of presenting.  
Written values clarification tasks (also known as self-affirmation tasks) have been 
shown to promote the elaboration and expression of values-consistent behaviours (Maio et 
al., 2001; Sagiv et al., 2011) and help people regulate negative cognitive and affective 
responses (Cohen et al., 2007). Researchers speculate that values articulations may work to 
lower the impact of distress, as it becomes less important than pursuing valued action; for 
example, people have been found more willing to experience pain following a values 
articulation that connected pain to a valued action (Paez-Blarrina et al., 2008). Several 
studies show support that value-guided action increases behavioural flexibility, helping 
people to better endure aversive situations (Branstetter-rost et al., 2009; Ciarrochi et al., 
2011; Gutierrez et al., 2004). This speaks to why values articulations, in which people 
focus on their values rather than negative internal experiences (anxiety), are a helpful 
addition to therapy for those experiencing social anxiety. Problems in value clarity, on the 
other hand, are related to negative outcomes, including experiential avoidance, general 
psychological distress, and anxiety (Bahraini et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2010). 
In social psychology, values-affirmation is a means of self-affirmation that serves a 
protective function when one is faced with a threat (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Most of the 
research has focused on the impact of values-affirmation on social psychological areas such 
as bias (e.g., affirming core values reduces self-serving bias; Sherman & Kim, 2005); the 
influence on distress and psychological functioning requires further clarity. Creswell et al. 
(2005) examined whether a values-affirmation would minimize psychological stress linked 
to an interpersonal challenge and determined that self-affirmation buffers against stress 
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reactivity to social evaluation. In contrast, although Czech et al. (2011) did find that people 
who lived a life consistent with their values had less anxiety towards a stress task, they also 
found that a values-affirmation exercise did not reduce anticipatory or post-task anxiety. 
Perhaps a values-affirmation task would be specifically effective for those who have the 
most to gain from it, similar to self-compassion.  
Self-Affirmation 
“Self-affirmation is the active affirmation of some important aspect of one’s self-
concept” (McQueen & Klein, 2006, p.300). The notion that people are motivated to 
maintain self-integrity is central to self-affirmation theory; this corresponds to the image of 
oneself as able to control important adaptive and moral outcomes in one’s life. Threats to 
this evoke psychological threat; however, when people affirm their general self-integrity, 
defensiveness diminishes (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
Self-affirmation has shown to have a wide range of benefits; for example, it reduces 
various forms of threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Cohen & Sherman, 2014), reduces 
negative consequences of chronic stress (Cohen et al., 2006; Creswell et al. 2013), helps 
instill confidence in one’s ability to reach one’s goals (Zhao & Nan, 2010), and buffers 
against physiological stress responding (Creswell et al., 2005). It also helps people to 
recognize their vulnerabilities and appreciate that bad things may happen (Klein et al., 
2011; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Tesser, 2000). Generally, people focus their attention to 
threats (Pratto & John, 1991). When self-affirmed, people can perceive daily stressors in 
the context of the bigger picture (i.e. using higher mental construal; Schmeichel & Vohs, 
2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), thus having less effect on one’s psychological state 
(Sherman et al., 2013). Self-affirmation can help people to see that they have integrity and 
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that regardless of any difficulties or stressors they may face, life overall is okay. For 
example, when self-affirmed participants (those who had wrote about an important value) 
were required to do a spontaneous speech task with social evaluation, they no longer 
showed signs of elevated cortisol (Creswell et al., 2005). This finding may have been a 
result of viewing the stressor in a larger picture of “things that truly matter for my 
adequacy” (Creswell et al., 2005). Interestingly, affirmations nurture an approach 
orientation to threat, as opposed to avoidance from threat, with self-affirmed participants 
reporting a threatening domain as more important to them compared to non-affirmed 
participants (Cohen et al., 2007).  
Stress often arises from events that call into question people’s sense of adaptive 
adequacy – how well they perceive themselves as able to meet life’s demands and control 
personal outcomes (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Therefore, affirming one’s values could 
buffer against stress by allowing one to attach one’s sense of adequacy in an alternative 
domain where it is not in question. Self-affirmed individuals are found to narrate adversity 
in a way that maintains self-adequacy and aids in their adaptive engagement with threats 
(Cohen et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2012). Just as self-compassion inductions are most 
effective for those who have the most to gain from them (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017; 
Leary et al., 2007), people who benefit most from implementing self-affirming narratives to 
daily stressors are those with the greatest number of daily hassles (Keough & Markus, 
1998); for example, perhaps somebody with high levels of social anxiety.  
Self-Affirmation Mechanism of Effect 
The mechanism of effect behind self-affirmation remains open for debate 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). There are currently two main 
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theoretical perspectives pertaining to how self-affirmation exerts its effects. The first is the 
self-resources account (i.e. raising self-esteem and self-regulatory strength; Shmeichel & 
Vohs, 2009; Sherman & Hartson, 2011), which states that self-affirmation boosts one’s 
self-image for coping with self-threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Though, self-affirmation 
researchers contend that self-affirmation should not merely be equated with bolstering 
people’s self-esteem (e.g., McQueen & Klein, 2006). The second is the transcending-self 
account, in which self-affirmation facilitates ones transcending self-image concerns by 
increasing other-directed feelings. For example, Crocker et al. (2008) compared a values-
affirmation condition with a control condition on 18 affective states. The values-
affirmation condition was significantly higher in 12 of the items (love, joyful, giving, 
empathic, connected, sympathy, grateful, proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical, 
humble). Further, they found that out of the 18 measures, the feelings ‘loving’ and 
‘connected’ were the only ones that explained the effect of a values-affirmation on 
acceptance of threatening health information. Recently, a novel self-compassion account of 
self-affirmation, which offers a combination of the self-resources and transcending-self 
perspectives, was proposed by Lindsay and Creswell (2014), in part inspiring this study. 
The self-compassion account is discussed in more detail later.  
There are two common types of self-affirmation manipulations: 1) value 
affirmations and 2) attribute affirmations. In value affirmations, one affirms oneself by 
highlighting values that are personally important (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007); in attribute 
affirmations, one affirms oneself by highlighting one’s characteristics (e.g., Cohen et al., 
2000).  To affirm the self, an event does not need to foster a feeling of overall excellence; 
rather, it must merely promote a sense of adequacy within one’s personal value (Cohen & 
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Sherman, 2014). Personal values have been described as the internalized standards one uses 
for self-evaluation (Rokeach, 1973). Often, people affirm themselves through writing about 
their connections to others (Shnabel et al., 2013) and to purposes that extend beyond their 
own person (Crocker et al., 2008).   
Likely the most popular technique (McQueen & Klein, 2006) used within self-
affirmation studies is the values-affirmation. In this exercise, participants are asked to rank 
a set of values from most to least important (e.g. friends and family, learning and 
education, religion and spirituality, etc.) and then write about their top ranked value. They 
are asked to discuss why that value is important to them, or how they have tried to live up 
to that value in the past.  To compare, a control condition typically discusses an 
unimportant value and writes about why it may be important to others (Crocker et al., 
2008).  
Self-Compassion  
Self-compassion (SC) originated in Buddhist thought, which places an emphasis on 
truly knowing and understanding the nature of oneself. There are three interrelated aspects 
of SC, each with a dichotomous construct: 1) self-kindness during trying times, such as 
failure, rather than being self-critical; 2) common humanity and viewing oneself as part of 
the larger human experience, as opposed to viewing oneself in isolation or alone in their 
suffering; and 3) mindfulness, in which one views both good and bad personal experiences 
and feelings in balance and with mindful awareness, rather than over-identifying with 
negative affect (Neff, 2003a).  
Research with healthy individuals has consistently established the benefits of SC 
showing that it promotes many adaptive qualities including life satisfaction, resilience and 
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wellness, emotional intelligence, self-determination and perceived competence (Neff, 
2003a), goal mastery and self-improvement motivation, intrinsic interest (Neff et al., 2005), 
personal initiative and making changes required for a more productive and fulfilling life 
(Neff et al., 2007), learning-approach goal orientation (Akin, 2008), adaptive coping, as 
opposed to avoidance (Costa & Pinto-Gouveia, 2013), a greater ability to cope with 
negative emotions and negative feedback (Neff et al., 2007; Heffernan et al., 2010; Waring 
& Kelly, 2019), use of first person plural pronouns (“we”; Barnard & Curry, 2011), social 
connectedness (Akin & Akin, 2015), and emotional balance (Leary et al., 2007). Research 
has also determined SC to be negatively associated with various detrimental affective states 
including anxiety, depression, self-criticism, self-judgment, rumination, and perfectionism 
(Neff, 2003a; Neff & Vonk, 2009; Dundas et al., 2017), anxiety level after considering 
weaknesses (Neff et al., 2007), self-referring words (“I”), fear of failure (Neff et al., 2005; 
Neff et al., 2018), and post-traumatic stress and panic following traumatic events (Zeller et 
al., 2014). SC theory posits that the psychological security required to reduce defensiveness 
in face of threat can be increased without needing to raise self-esteem or bolster self-image 
(Leary et al., 2007). SC helps to reduce the anxiety that comes with the self-criticism 
following negative events, so that one no longer needs to defend against it (Neff et al., 
2007). 
A commonly used technique for manipulating SC is a writing exercise in which 
individuals discuss a negative life event, whether it be in one’s personal life, work life or 
social life.  They are directed to write about an event that made them feel particularly bad 
about themselves, as SC has been found to be most relevant in times of shame and self-
criticism (Neff, 2003b).  Participants receive three prompts, each relating to one of the 
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three components of SC.  The self-kindness prompt urges them to express concern and 
understanding to themselves, in such a way they might express concern for a friend in the 
same situation; the common humanity prompt asks them to list ways in which others may 
have had similar experiences; the mindfulness prompt encourages their detailing of the 
events and feelings to be as balanced as possible. Using this technique, Breines and Chen 
(2012) found that inducing SC increased the belief that shortcomings can be changed, the 
desire to make amends, effort put forth studying for a test following failure, and motivation 
to improve a personal weakness. In their study, SC influenced people to engage in positive 
responses following negative events.    
Arch et al. (2014) determined that people who underwent a SC manipulation 
consisting of metta (loving-kindness) meditation showed an increase in levels of SC 
relative to a control group.  Additionally, these individuals displayed lower levels of 
salivary alpha amylase (sAA) following the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kudielka et al., 
2007), signifying an inhibited sympathetic system response, which has been connected to 
lower defensiveness (Arch et al., 2014).  A decrease in levels of sAA following a SC 
induction demonstrates individual’s lower levels of anxiety in response to a socially 
threatening situation (the TSST). This study reveals that SC training produces greater 
effects beyond increasing one’s level of SC. They went beyond correlational research, 
providing support for the idea that SC may have a more instrumental relationship among 
certain psychological states, such as anxiety.   
Individuals with high social anxiety tend to engage in extreme post-event 
processing (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008; Helbig-Lang et al., 2016), something SC has 
been shown to effectively reduce. Blackie and Kocovski (2017) found that among 
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participants with high social anxiety, a SC induction following a speech task led to lower 
post-event processing the next day and increased participants’ willingness to engage in 
future social situations.  
Arch et al. (2018) compared a SC induction among a clinical sample of people with 
social anxiety disorder (SAD) to a healthy control (HC) group. Given that people with SAD 
engage in post-event processing they were interested in determining whether SC was 
helpful in recovery from social stressors. Participants were put through two social stressors 
(a speech task, and self-evaluation and feedback task) before completing a written SC 
induction. Their findings showed that individuals with SAD displayed greater increases in 
state SC and greater decreases in state anxiety following the induction relative to the HC 
group. Similarly, SC has been found to be an effective strategy for those with high levels of 
social anxiety, compared to those with low social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), in 
reducing anticipatory anxiety towards a social speech task. It seems as though SC has an 
important role in reducing anxiety, especially among those who need it the most.  
Sure enough, research has found that SC inductions are more effective for those 
who are initially low in SC (Arch et al., 2014).  For example, Leary et al. (2007) showed 
that low self-compassionate individuals who underwent a SC induction showed an increase 
in perception of similarity to others, while those high in SC were not influenced by the SC 
induction. In the same study, Leary et al. also found that SC served as a buffer against 
negative emotions when people engaged in an event involving undesirable self-evaluation. 
Moreover, participants who underwent the SC manipulation attributed the negative event to 
“the kind of person [they] are” to a greater degree than the control group. The control 
group showed a positive correlation between taking responsibility and experiencing 
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negative emotions; this correlation was not present for those in the SC condition. This 
study demonstrates that those who receive SC training are less defensive (as depicted by 
increased accepting of responsibility) and show lower levels of distress (as depicted by no 
correlation between taking responsibility and later negative emotions) compared to a 
control group.  
Self-Affirmation and Self-Compassion 
As previously mentioned, the fundamental main thematic fear in social anxiety 
disorder is that “the self is deficient” (Moscovitch, 2009), noting that people with social 
anxiety are highly self-critical. Mindfulness-based approaches (such as self-compassion) 
and self-affirmation are both constructs that address patterns of self-criticism (Creswell et 
al., 2007; Lannin et al., 2018), both of which have also been proposed as possible 
mechanisms through which expressive writing works. Mindfulness involves accepting 
one’s inner experiences, consequently increasing cognitive flexibility and decreasing 
unwanted thought patterns such as self-criticism (Baer et al., 2006). Self-affirmation 
interventions address negative thought patterns (such as self-criticism) in a different way – 
through reminding oneself of valued personal aspects (attributes or values) in order to 
protect self-worth (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  This is associated with decreased stress and 
increased well-being (Creswell et al., 2007), as well as intentions of reducing self-criticism 
(Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012).   
Recall that there are currently two theoretical perspectives on self-affirmation – the 
self-resources perspective, and the transcending-self perspective. Lindsay and Creswell 
(2014) proposed a novel self-compassion perspective of self-affirmation that connected the 
self-resources account and the transcending-self account for a more complete explanation 
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of self-affirmation. According to the self-compassion perspective, self-affirmation boosts 
one’s self-image by raising self-directed feelings of sympathy and love, and lowering 
feelings of vulnerability and criticism (Neff, 2003a; Leary et al., 2007); therefore, 
increasing self-compassion is one form of boosting one’s self-image (self-resources 
perspective). It is also associated with increased feelings of love and connection (the self-
transcendence perspective; Neff, 2003a; Crocker et al., 2008). They propose, however, that 
the self-image boost is about feeling more compassion toward the self (rather than the 
common self-esteem boost that is suggested; Neff & Vonk, 2009) and that these 
compassionate feelings generated by self-affirmation are not other-directed (as proposed by 
the self-transcendence perspective).  
Lindsay and Creswell’s (2014) study showed self-affirmation to increase self-
compassionate feelings, and that these feelings promote pro-social behaviors. They found 
support for the compassionate feelings being self-directed, specifically. Moreover, self-
affirmation enhanced feelings of self-compassion greater among those initially low in self-
compassion. This is similar to research on self-compassion, which has demonstrated self-
compassion training to be more effective among those initially low in self-compassion 
(Leary et al., 2007). The effect of self-affirmation writing on self-compassion may also 
explain why studies on self-affirmation struggle to provide evidence that the mechanism of 
change is simply state self-esteem or positive mood (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006; McQueen & Klein, 2006). Lindsay and Creswell acknowledge 
the need for research to clarify how self-compassion and self-affirmation processes are 
entangled.  
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Both self-affirmation and self-compassion are social tactics that touch on your 
relation to others: self-compassion through the idea of a common humanity and self-
affirmation through relating to an important value in such a way that makes you feel 
connected to others or to being a significant member of a society.  Research suggests that 
values-affirmation effects may be driven by tendencies to write about why their important 
value makes them feel connected to others (Shnabel et al., 2013). Perhaps it is the feeling 
of common humanity and connecting the self to others, compassionately, that aids to buffer 
against self-threatening events and negative emotions.  
Further, Stefan (2019) found that approach coping strategies in general increased 
self-compassion, which in turn assisted in reducing social anxiety; avoidance coping had 
the opposite effect. As mentioned earlier, affirmations nurture an approach orientation to 
threat as opposed to avoidance from threat. For example, self-affirmation assists in the 
process of acknowledging one’s weaknesses and the fact that negative experiences are a 
part of life; in other words, self-affirmation aids in acceptance, which is a noteworthy 
aspect of approach coping strategies, along with problem solving and seeking support 
(Stefan, 2019). This further supports the notion that self-affirmation, being an approach 
coping strategy, may be a means to increase self-compassion.  
Present Research 
The current research was designed to explore the relationship between self-
affirmation and self-compassion within the domain of social anxiety. A values-affirmation 
task is not only a self-affirmation task, which is noted as an effective tactic for combatting 
patterns of self-criticism, something central in social anxiety (Creswell et al., 2007; 
Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012), but it is also a values-based strategy, which has been noted 
 
20 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
as an important component to add to behavioural interventions for anxiety disorders (Hayes 
et al., 2012). Therefore, the current research sought to determine whether a values-
affirmation would be effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with high levels of 
social anxiety. Whereas Lindsay and Creswell (2014) focused on increasing prosocial 
behaviour, this study is focusing on decreasing psychological distress, thus enhancing our 
understanding of these two approaches as therapeutic techniques to be utilized within 
mindfulness- and acceptance-based interventions. The goal of the present research was to 
determine whether self-affirmation is effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety. Further, 
the present research aims to further explore the self-compassion account of self-
affirmation. The main hypothesis is that self-affirmation will reduce anticipatory anxiety 
towards a speech task by increasing participants’ levels of state self-compassion.  
Three studies were conducted to investigate whether self-affirmation led to reduced 
levels of anticipatory anxiety, and whether this effect was mediated by an increase in state 
self-compassion. Study one compared the effects of a self-affirmation, self-compassion and 
a control condition on anticipatory anxiety pertaining to an upcoming speech task. Study 
two compared the modified self-affirmation manipulation used in study one to a standard 
self-affirmation manipulation. Study three compared a standard self-affirmation condition 
to a control condition on anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task and 
investigated state self-compassion as a mediator. Study three also preselected participants 
with high versus low social anxiety to determine if self-affirmation is more effective for 
those with high social anxiety than it is for those with low social anxiety, similar to what 
has been found for self-compassion (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017).  
Study One 
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Study one investigated the difference between a self-compassion condition (SC), a 
self-affirmation condition, and a control condition in levels of anticipatory anxiety 
pertaining to an upcoming speech task. It was hypothesized that both SC and self-
affirmation groups would have reduced anticipatory anxiety compared to the control group. 
Further, it was expected that both experimental conditions would lead to increased levels of 
state self-compassion which in turn would lead to reduced anticipatory anxiety towards the 
upcoming speech task (see Figure 1).  
Method  
Participants 
There were 93 undergraduate students between the ages of 17-25 (mean age=19.07; 
62% female; 56% white, 25% Asian, 4% black, 15% other) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study. During the 
debrief, all participants were asked if they were suspicious about whether they would have 
to give the speech or not. No participants had to be excluded due to suspicion. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a SC condition (n=30), self-affirmation condition (n=32), or a 
control condition (n=31). The participants received 1.0 credit towards their course grade for 
partaking in the study.   
Materials  
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI – II; α = .91; 
Beck, Steer, & Brown 1996) is a 21-item self-rating scale that assesses individual’s 
negative thoughts and feelings during the past two weeks. Each item is rated on a 4-
point Likert scale (0 = not at all feeling à 3 = strong feeling).  This revised edition 
incorporates items to measure severe depressive symptoms that may require hospitalization  
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Figure 1.  
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(i.e. 0 =”I do not feel I am worthless” à 3 = “I feel utterly worthless”). Scores range from 
0 to 63, with higher scores signifying higher levels of depression. The BDI has been found 
to have good reliability regardless of the population (α = .92 for outpatients; α = .93 for 
college students), good test-retest reliability at one week (α = .93) and has good construct 
validity (Beck, Steer, & Brown). 
Social Phobia Inventory. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) 
was used as a measure of social anxiety in studies 1 and 2, and as a pre-screen measure of 
social anxiety in study 3.  The SPIN is a 17-item self-rating scale that measures 
individual’s level of social anxiety over the past week within each of the symptom domains 
of SAD: fear (e.g., “talking to strangers scares me”); avoidance (e.g., “I avoid speaking to 
anyone in authority”); and physiological arousal (e.g., “Sweating in front of people causes 
me distress”). Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all 
à 4 = extremely). Scores range from 0 to 68, with higher scores signifying higher levels of 
social anxiety. The SPIN has been shown to have good test-retest reliability, internal 
consistency, and validity (Connor et al., 2000).  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale. The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; 
Mattick & Clarke, 1998) was used as a measure of anxiety in studies 1 and 2, and as a pre-
screen measure for level of social anxiety in study 3. It is a 20-item self-rating measure on 
which respondents rate their experiences in social domains associated with social anxiety 
(e.g., “I find it difficult mixing comfortably with the people I work with”; “I feel I’ll say 
something embarrassing when talking”). Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point 
Likert scale (0 = not at all true of me à 4 = extremely true of me).  Possible scores range 
from 0 to 80, with higher scores representing higher levels of social anxiety. The SIAS has 
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been shown to be particularly reliable for undergraduate students (α = .99) and people with 
SAD (α = .93) and has a strong test-retest reliability (r = .94) at four and twelve weeks 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
Self-Compassion Scale. The Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003a) was used 
as a baseline measurement of participants’ level of SC.  The SCS is a 26-item self-rating 
scale composed of six subscales: self-kindness (e.g., “I try to be loving towards myself 
when I’m feeling emotional pain”); self-judgment (e.g., “I’m disapproving and judgmental 
about my own flaws and inadequacies”); common humanity (e.g., “when I feel inadequate 
in some way I try to remind myself that feelings of inadequacy are shared by most 
people”); isolation (e.g., “when I think about my inadequacies, it tends to make me feel 
more separate and cut off from the rest of the world”); mindfulness (e.g., “when something 
painful happens I try to take a balanced view of the situation”); and over-identification 
(e.g., “when something painful happens I tend to blow the incident out of proportion”). 
Each item is rated by the participant on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree à 5 = 
strongly agree).  The negative subscale items (self-judgment, isolation, and over-
identification) are reverse-scored. Total scores were calculated by adding each item; 
possible scores range from 26-130. The SCS has been shown to have consistently high 
reliability across various populations (Total scale α = .91; all subscale αs ≥ .76;) and has 
strong predictive, convergent, and discriminate validity (Neff, 2016).  
Self-Esteem. A one-item self-esteem scale was used: “I have high self-esteem”. 
Participants responded to this statement on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me à 7 = 
very true of me). 
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Subjective Units of Distress Scale. The Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; 
Wolpe, 1969) is a one-item question concerning the level of distress the participant is 
feeling at that moment, pertaining to their upcoming speech task (0 = no distress à 100 = 
highest distress possible). The SUDS has shown to have convergent and discriminant 
validity, concurrent validity, and predictive validity (Daeho et al., 2008).  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Form. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory – State Version (STAI-S; Spielberger et al., 1983) was used to determine the 
participants’ level of state anxiety pertaining to their upcoming speech task.  The STAI-S is 
a 20-item self-rating questionnaire concerning how anxious a participant feels at that 
current time.  A sample question is “I feel strained”, which the participant rates on a 4-
point scale (1 = not at all à 4 = very much so).  Total scores can range from 20-80, with 
higher scores signifying higher levels of state anxiety. The STAI-S has high internal 
consistency (ranging from .83 to .92; Kaplan & Smith, 1995), as well as good test-retest 
reliability. It is used on both clinical and non-clinical groups (Spielberger et al., 1970). 
Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire. The Anticipatory Social 
Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen and Clark, 2003) is a 12-item measure that 
examines trait anticipatory processing such as preparing for the social event or imagining 
worst-case scenarios.  The questions were modified to refer to the speech task that 
participants were required to do in the experiment (e.g., “I made a conscious effort to not 
think about the speech”; “I reminded myself of things I should not do”). Participants rated 
their response on a 4-point scale (1 = never à 4 = always). The ASBQ has high internal 
consistency (α=.88) and good reliability (α=.87; Mills et al., 2013).  
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State Self-Compassion Scale – modified. The state Self-Compassion Scale (S-
SCS) was modified from Neff’s SCS – short version (Raes et al., 2011; included in 
Appendix A as it is a modified scale) to refer to present moment feelings of self-
compassion, rather than feeling of self-compassion generally. It is comprised of 12 
questions regarding how they feel when they look back on the mistake that they wrote 
about during the study (e.g., “I am trying to take a balanced view of the situation”; “when 
thinking about my experience, I am obsessing and fixating on everything that went 
wrong”). Participants responded on a 5-point scale (1 = almost never à 5 = almost 
always). Unfortunately, no state self-compassion scale existed at the time of this study and 
so a modified measure had to be used (see Appendix A for modified measure).  
Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of four questions that 
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all à 7= extremely): 1) “how 
important to you is the value you chose to write about?”; 2) “in general, I try to live up to 
this value.”; 3) “how self-critical were you when writing about your mistake?”; 4) “to what 
extent did you write about your mistake compassionately?” 
Procedure (see Figure 2) 
 Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand thought 
processes surrounding important values. Demographic measures and baseline measures 
(depression, self-compassion, social anxiety) were administered to ensure that there were 
no baseline differences between conditions. 
Participants were all required to rank a set of 12 values from most (ranked number 
1) to least (ranked number 12) important. These values are as follows: artistic skills, sense 
of humor, relationships with friends/family, spontaneity/living in the moment, social skills,  
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Figure 2.  
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athletics, musical ability/appreciation, physical attractiveness, creativity, academic skills, 
romance, religion, other. Participants were then randomly assigned to the SC manipulation 
(n=30), self-affirmation manipulation (n=32), or a control condition (n=31). See Appendix 
A for conditions.  
Self-compassion manipulation. The self-compassion manipulation was a 
derivative of that used by Leary et al. (2007); however, it was revised to focus on important 
values to remain consistent with the self-affirmation condition.  Participants were 
instructed to write about a negative situation that they had previously experienced within a 
particularly important domain. Discussing a mistake was used as part of the manipulation 
as Neff (2003b) has noted that self-compassion is most relevant in circumstances that 
provoke feelings of shame and self-criticism.  Specifically, the instructions read: “Consider 
your top ranked value (the value most important to you). Think about a time when you 
made a mistake pertaining to this important value.” The participants were provided with 
three prompts intended to touch on each of the three facets of SC.  The self-kindness 
prompt asked them to “write a paragraph expressing kindness to [themselves] in the same 
way [they] might express kindness for someone close to [them]”; the common humanity 
prompt instructed participants to “list some of the ways in which other people have 
experienced similar events to the one [they] described”; the mindfulness prompt requested 
participants to “list the emotions [they] felt during this and event and explain (in as 
balanced a manner as possible) why [they] felt that emotion”.   
Self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation manipulation was based on a 
standard manipulation used in previous research (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), though it was 
revised to include writing about a mistake rather than merely a memorable experience in 
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order to maintain consistency with the SC condition. Participants were also instructed to 
write about a mistake pertaining to their top ranked value. They were further prompted with 
four items commonly used in self-affirmation manipulations, although revised to be within 
the context of writing about a mistake. The prompts were as follows: “briefly state 3 or 4 
times in which you made a mistake related to this important value”; “describe the mistake 
that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to you”; “explain in full why this 
value in important”; and “identify your top two reasons why it’s important to you”. Typical 
values-affirmations ask participants to recall 3 or 4 experiences related to their important 
value and to discuss why their value is important and how they have lived up to this value 
in the past. They don’t typically work with mistakes made in the context of important 
values; however, the goal was to make the conditions as similar as possible.  
Control condition. The control condition was intended to account for any effects 
resulting from writing about a negative event, but without inducing any sense of self-
compassion or self-affirmation. Participants received three similar prompts to the SC 
condition; though, their prompts had no relation to self-compassion. The prompts were as 
follows: “write a paragraph describing your role in this event”; “who else was involved in 
this event?”; and “describe your feelings about this event”. The control condition was also 
meant to control for writing about a value in general. Rather than writing about a mistake in 
their top ranked value, they wrote about one in their bottom ranked value. They were also 
asked to “Explain in full why this value is important to others. Identify the top two reasons 
you believe this value to be important to others.”  
Following the manipulation phase, there was a brief manipulation check regarding 
how important the value they wrote about was to them. All participants then underwent an 
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anxiety induction, which was implemented through a three-minute impromptu speech task.  
Participants were told the following: “This portion of the study examines how people talk 
about important values. This is an important topic because research has shown that how 
people discuss important values is correlated with whether they adhere to specific values 
and live by these values in everyday life.” Participants were told they will be speaking in 
front of the group (ranging from 1-5 people, depending on how full the research slot is). 
Following the anxiety induction, participants were asked to complete the SUDS, the 
STAI-S, and the ASBQ to determine their current state of anxiety. Lastly, they completed a 
state self-compassion measure, modified from the SCS scale (Neff, 2003a). Upon 
completion of these measures, participants were told that they were not actually required to 
give the speech. 
Data Analysis  
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine any 
significant effects of the manipulation (SC vs. self-affirmation vs. control) on their state 
anxiety or state self-compassion (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ, and S-SCS). Hayes’s Process 
(Hayes, 2018; version 3) was used to run mediation analyses to determine whether self-
compassion and self-affirmation conditions had higher levels of state self-compassion and 
whether this reduced anticipatory anxiety. 
Results  
Baseline Measures  
  Participants’ social anxiety, depression, self-compassion and self-esteem were 
measured across conditions (see Table 1). There were no significant differences at the 
multivariate level, F (2,90) = 1.40, p = .20. However, upon closer investigation, univariate  
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Table 1 
Baseline Descriptive Statistics by Condition 
 Self-Compassion Self-Affirmation Control 
 
  
Measure  M SD     M  SD     M  SD    F 
(2,89) 
 p 
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analyses revealed significant baseline differences in social anxiety, SIAS: F (2,90) = 4.61, 
p = .012 and SPIN: F (2,90) = 3.67, p = .030, and in self-compassion, SCS; F (2,90) = 4.62, 
p = .012. Participants in the control condition had significantly higher scores on the SIAS 
and the SPIN compared to the SC condition (p =.012 and p=.030, respectively).  
Participants in the control condition had significantly lower levels of self-compassion 
compared to participants in the SC condition (p=.009). These measures were controlled for 
when conducting future analyses.     
Manipulation Check 
 A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the chosen value 
was to the participant, how much they try to live up to that value, and how self-critically  
and self-compassionately participants wrote about their experiences pertaining to their 
important value (see Table 2). There were significant differences across conditions in how 
important they rated their value, F (2,90) = 33.39, p < .001, how much they try to live up to 
their value, F (2,90) = 23.11, p < .001, how self-critical, F (2,90) = 9.46, p < .001, and how 
self-compassionate, F (2,90) = 13.98, p < .001, they were when writing about their 
experience.  
The self-affirmation and SC conditions considered the value they chose to write 
about as significantly more important compared to the control condition (both p <.001); 
they did not differ from one another in how important the value was to them (p =.59).  The 
self-affirmation and SC conditions try to live up to the value more compared to the control 
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Table 2 
Manipulation Check Items by Condition 
          SC SA Control   
Measure  M SD     M  SD     M  SD    F 
(2,90) 
 p 
         
Importance 6.40a 1.28 6.62a .75 3.55b 2.46 26.65 .000 
 
Live up to 
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self-affirmation and SC conditions were significantly more self-critical (p <.001 and p 
=.004, respectively) and self-compassionate (both p <.001), compared to the control  
condition. They did not differ from one another on either measure (p =.22 and p =.21, 
respectively).  
Effect of Condition on State Anxiety  
              A MANCOVA was run using the STAI-S, ASBQ, SUDS and S-SCS as  
dependent variables. Social anxiety (SIAS and SPIN) and self-compassion (SCS) were 
entered as covariates due to baseline differences. The MANCOVA showed no significant 
differences, F (2,86) = 0.22, p =.99, Λ = .010.  
Four ANCOVAs (see Table 3) were run to look at the effect of condition on the 
four dependent measures: general distress (SUDS); state anxiety (STAI-S); anticipatory 
processing (ASBQ); and state self-compassion (S-SCS). Social anxiety (SIAS and SPIN) 
and self-compassion (SCS) were entered as covariates. After controlling for these baseline 
measures, there were no significant differences between conditions in general distress, 
SUDS; F (2, 86) = .24, p = .79, η2 = .006, state anxiety, STAI-S; F (2, 87) = .27, p = .77, η2 
= .006, anticipatory processing, ASBQ; F (2, 87) = .05, p = .95, η2 = .001, or state self-
compassion, S-SCS; F (2, 87) = .26, p = .78, η2 = .006. 
Hayes’s Process was used to run a moderation analysis (model 1) using ‘condition’ 
as the predictor variable, social anxiety (baseline SPIN score) as the moderator, and anxiety 
as the outcome variable (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ) to determine whether either of the 
experimental conditions, self-affirmation or self-compassion, was more effective for people 
who score certain levels of social anxiety. The SPIN was used as the moderator as it covers 
a range or social anxiety, whereas the SIAS focuses on social interaction. This decision is  
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Table 3 
Anticipatory Anxiety and State Self-Compassion by Condition (includes covariates) 
 Self-Compassion Self-Affirmation  Control 
 
  
Measure  M SD     M  SD     M  SD df    F  p 
         
























27.20 6.07 29.41 8.02 30.39 9.17 2,87 .04 .96 
S-SCS 28.67 7.00 25.94 7.65 24.42 6.80 2,87 .27 .76 
          
 
Note. SUDS= subjective units of distress scale; STAI-S= state-trait anxiety inventory – 
state; ASBQ= anticipatory social behaviors questionnaire; S-SCS= state self-compassion 
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consistent with other literature, which used the SPIN as the primary measure of social 
anxiety (Kocovski et al., 2013). Baseline self-compassion was entered as a covariate due to  
baseline differences between conditions. Neither moderation model using ASBQ or STAI-
S as the outcome measures showed significant differences in anticipatory processing or 
state anxiety between conditions among different levels of the moderator (baseline social 
anxiety). The moderation model using SUDS as the outcome measure was significant, F (6, 
85) = 9.31, p < .001, R2 = .40. For those with low baseline social anxiety: the difference 
between the control and self-affirmation group was not significant, b = -7.03, t (85) = -.86, 
p = .39; the difference between the control and SC condition was approaching significance, 
b = -15.28, t (85) = -1.92, p = .06. For those with low baseline social anxiety, those in the 
SC condition had a 15.28 unit decrease in distress compared to the control group.  For 
those with average baseline social anxiety: there was no significant difference between the 
control group and the self-affirmation condition, b = -1.34, t (85) = -.25, p =.81, or the SC 
condition, b = -1.01, t (85) = -.17, p = .87.  For those with higher baseline social anxiety: 
there was no significant difference between the control condition and the self-affirmation 
condition, b = 4.34, t (85) = .63, p=.54, or the SC condition, b = 13.26, t (85) = 1.40, p = 
.17. 
A mediation analysis was done to test whether state self-compassion (S-SCS) 
mediated the effect of condition on anticipatory anxiety (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ); baseline 
differences in social anxiety (SPIN & SIAS) and self-compassion (SCS) were included as 
covariates. The models were significant; however, once looking closer this significance 
was just driven by the significant paths of the covariates. None of the other paths were 
significant. 
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After controlling for baseline differences in social anxiety and self-compassion, 
neither the self-affirmation condition nor the SC condition showed significantly different 
levels on the S-SCS, t (86) = -.62, p = .24 and t (86) = .02, p = .98, the SUDS, t (86) = .26, 
p = .80 and t (86) = -.40, p = .69, the STAI-S, t (86) = -.18, p = .86 and t (86) = -.69, p = 
.50,  or the ASBQ, t (86) = .30, p = .77 and t (86) = .30, p = .77, compared to the control 
condition. 
Discussion 
It was hypothesized that the self-affirmation and self-compassion (SC) conditions 
would have lower anticipatory anxiety compared to the control condition. Further, self-
compassion was expected to mediate this effect with both experimental conditions having 
higher state self-compassion compared to the control condition, which would lead to lower 
anticipatory anxiety.   
There were baseline differences between the SC condition and control condition in 
social anxiety and self-compassion, such that the SC condition had lower baseline levels of 
social anxiety and higher baseline levels of self-compassion. Once the SPIN, SIAS and 
SCS were added as covariates there were no significant differences in anticipatory anxiety 
or state self-compassion between conditions. Inducing self-compassion has been found 
previously to reduce anticipatory anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017); however, that 
study had preselected participants for high versus low social anxiety. They found an 
interaction effect such that a self-compassion induction led to lower anticipatory anxiety 
than a control condition for those with high social anxiety, not for those with low social 
anxiety. Given the present study did not preselect participants based on their trait social 
anxiety, we were not able to replicate those findings. Perhaps had this study included a 
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sample of participants with high social anxiety, who were shown to be more receptive to 
self-compassion training, we may have replicated those results.  
Surprisingly, the moderation model actually showed that the self-compassion 
condition displayed significantly less distress than the control condition for those with low 
social anxiety and had no significant effect on those with high social anxiety. This is 
opposite to what would be expected based on previous findings (Harwood & Kocovski, 
2017). Unlike the previous study, the current study had the personal mistake contextualized 
within their most important value. This choice was made to maintain consistency with the 
self-affirmation condition; however, most self-compassion manipulations are not based on 
mistakes within their most important value. In response to distressing social events, 
individuals with social anxiety disorder report symptoms such as re-experiencing, 
avoidance, and hyper-arousal, which are characteristic of those found among people with 
PTSD (Erwin et al., 2006). It may be that writing about a mistake within the domain of 
your most important value overrides the beneficial effects of the self-compassion induction 
for those with high social anxiety, specifically, despite still showing a beneficial effect for 
those with low social anxiety. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, there were no significant differences in anticipatory 
anxiety between the self-affirmation and control condition. One plausible reason for this 
may be that the self-affirmation condition was modified to make it more similar to the SC 
condition, which may have disrupted the authenticity of the self-affirmation condition. 
Whereas typical values-affirmations have participants write about a top-rated value and 
discuss how they live up to it, the current study had participants write about their top-rated 
value in the context of a negative experience – a mistake. The choice to modify the self-
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affirmation manipulation to discuss a mistake was made in order to ensure the self-
compassion and self-affirmation manipulations were as similar as possible. It is possible 
that having participants write about mistakes they have made within a personally important 
value may have a detrimental effect on their psychological state, rather than help buffer 
against psychological distress (anxiety), as was originally hypothesized. Self-affirmation 
relates to self-integrity and thinking about a mistake in a personally important value may 
threaten self-integrity. Although focusing on a mistake may have threated self-integrity, it 
still did not lead to higher distress than the control condition, who wrote about a mistake in 
an unimportant value. In fact, although there were no significant differences, the pattern of 
results was in line with the hypothesis in that those in the self-affirmation condition showed 
lower levels of general distress (SUDS) and state anxiety (STAI-S) compared to the control 
condition. 
One final interesting finding to note is the manipulation check showed that 
participants in the self-affirmation and self-compassion conditions perceived themselves to 
be more self-compassionate than the control condition when writing about their mistake. 
The fact that the self-affirmation condition perceived themselves as more self-
compassionate may stem from the fact that self-compassion is most relevant during times 
of shame of self-criticism (Neff, 2003a) and their writing about a mistake may have 
invoked such feelings, or it may be a result of the self-affirmation component specifically. 
Participants in the self-affirmation and self-compassion conditions also perceived 
themselves to be more self-critical than the control condition. This makes sense, given that 
both of the experimental conditions were instructed to write about a mistake in the context 
of a personally important value, whereas the control condition wrote about a mistake in a 
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value that had no significance in their life. It is likely that participants are less self-critical 
when discussing something that holds no value in their life.  
Study Two  
The second study was conducted online in an effort to explain the results found in 
the first study. Specifically, the primary aim was to determine whether the self-affirmation 
manipulation was a fair representation of self-affirmation. Typically, self-affirmation 
manipulations require participants to write about positive personal experiences within the 
domain of an important value (Ferrer et al., 2017; Meier et al., 2015). In study one, 
participants in the self-affirmation condition wrote about a negative experience (a mistake) 
in order to increase internal validity by keeping the procedure as similar as possible to the 
self-compassion condition, which typically involves writing about a mistake (Leary et al., 
2007; Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). The purpose of this second study was to compare a 
traditional self-affirmation exercise with one that focuses on a mistake. It was expected that 
the self-affirmation condition in the context of a mistake would lead to higher distress and 
more negative affect compared to a standard self-affirmation manipulation.  
Although there are mixed results regarding whether self-affirmation directly 
influences affect (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005; Weisenfeld et al., 1999), the focus of the 
current study was to investigate whether there were differences between a standard self-
affirmation (SA-standard) condition and a mistake self-affirmation (SA-mistake) condition 
on 18 affective states following the manipulation phase. General distress was also 
measured. It was hypothesized that the SA-mistake condition would lead to lower positive 
affect, higher negative affect, and higher distress compared to the SA-standard and control 
conditions.  
 




There were 121 undergraduate students between the ages of 17-25 (average age 
19.88; 76% female; 61% White, 17.5% Asian, 7.5% Black, 14% other) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. The first was a standard 
self-affirmation condition, in which they wrote about a memorable experience in a 
personally important value (n =39). The second was a mistake self-affirmation condition 
(n=41), in which they wrote about a mistake within a personally important domain. The 
third was a control condition (n=41). The participants received credit towards their course 
grade for partaking in this online study.  
Materials 
The baseline measures used were the SPIN, SIAS, BDI, SCS and a one-item Self-
Esteem scale. The SUDS and modified SCS were used again as dependent measures. The 
Affective States Measure was also used as a dependent measure. 
Affective States Measure. An Affective States Measure (borrowed from Crocker et 
al., 2008) was used to assess general mood. The Affect Scale contains 18 items examining 
the following feelings: love, joyful, giving, empathic, connected, sympathy, grateful, 
proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical, humble, selfish, scared, sad, confused, and angry. 
Participants rated their response on a 4-point scale (1 = not at all à 4 = very much so).  
State Self-Compassion Scale. The state Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS) was 
modified from Neff’s SCS – short version (Raes et al., 2011) to assess present moment 
feelings of self-compassion, rather than feelings of self-compassion generally. Whereas the 
 
42 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
modified version in study one specified feelings towards a speech, this version specified 
feelings towards a past experience. 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of six questions that 
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all à 7= extremely): 1) “how 
important to you is the value you chose to write about?”; 2) “in general, I try to live up to 
this value.”; 3) “looking back, how self-critical were you when writing about your personal 
event?”; 4) “to what extent did you write about your personal event compassionately?”; 5) 
“how positive was the event?”; and 6) “how negative was the event?” 
Procedure  
 Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand 
thoughts and feelings associated with personally important values. Baseline measures (i.e. 
social anxiety, depression, self-compassion) were administered to ensure that there were no 
baseline differences between conditions. Participants were all asked to rank a set of 12 
values before being randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) standard self-
affirmation (n = 39); 2) mistake self-affirmation manipulation (n = 41); and 3) control (n = 
41).  
Standard self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation (SA-standard) 
manipulation was a standard technique used in previous work (Ferrer et al., 2017; Meier et 
al., 2015).  Participants were instructed to recall personal experiences pertaining to their top 
ranked value. They were prompted to describe three or four memorable experiences, to 
describe the most exceptional or influential experience, and to explain why this value is 
important to them.  
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Mistake self-affirmation condition. The mistake self-affirmation condition (SA-
mistake) was derived from the standard self-affirmation manipulation; however, it was 
revised to discuss a mistake rather than just any experience. The prompts were kept as 
similar as possible to the standard self-affirmation condition, while being made to focus on 
a mistake. Participants in this condition were prompted to recall three or four mistakes they 
have made pertaining to their most important value, to describe the most exceptional or 
influential mistake that they made, and to explain why the value is important to them.  
Control condition.  The control condition was intended to account for any effects 
resulting from writing about a value in general and writing about a mistake in general. 
Rather than writing about a memorable event in their top ranked value, they wrote about a 
mistake in their bottom ranked value. They were asked to “describe 3 or 4 times in which 
[they] made a mistake related to this value”, to “describe the mistake that was most 
exception or influential” to them, and to “explain in full why this value is important to 
others. Identify the top two reasons you believe this value to be important to others.” 
Following the manipulation phase, there was a manipulation check regarding how 
important the value they wrote about was to them, how much they try to live up to that 
value, how self-critically and how self-compassionately participants wrote about their 
experience, and how positive or negative their experience that they wrote about was.  
Participants were then asked to complete the SUDS to depict the highest level of 
distress they experienced when writing about their personal experience. They also 
completed the Affect Scale to determine to what extent they felt each of the 18 feelings 
when writing about their experience (e.g., love, connected, critical, sad, etc.). Finally, they 
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completed a state self-compassion scale to determine how self-compassionate they felt in 
that moment discussing their personal experiences.  
Data Analysis  
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine any 
significant effects of the manipulation (SA-standard vs. SA-mistake vs. control) on 




Participants’ social anxiety, depression, self-compassion and self-esteem were 
measured across conditions (see Table 4). There were no significant baseline differences 
found on the SIAS, SPIN, SCS, BDI or self-esteem scale (all F < 1). Additionally, 
participants selected similar values across conditions (relationships with friends and family 
chosen as top value 46-51% of the time).  
Manipulation Check  
A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the value they 
chose to write about was to them, how much they try to live up to their value, how self-
critically or self-compassionately they wrote about their personal experience, and how 
positive and negative the experience that they wrote about was (see Table 5). There were 
significant differences on all measures (all p <.01).  
As expected, the control group ranked the value as significantly less important to 
them and tried to live up to their value significantly less than both the SA-standard and the  
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Table 4 
Baseline Measures by Condition 
          Control SA-standard SA-mistake   
Measure  M SD     M  SD     M  SD    F  
(2,118) 
 p 
         
Depression 14.95 9.17 16.33 11.58 14.07 10.30 .48 .62 
 
SIAS 
            
29.76 
                
14.66 
            
32.68 
         
14.00 
            
32.68 
             
16.51 


























75.37 14.37 74.62 20.09 79.32 13.46 .99 .38 
Self-esteem  
 
4.22 1.17 4.18 1.54 4.32 1.47 .10 .90 
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Table 5 
Manipulation Check Items by Condition 
     Control SA-standard   SA-mistake   
Measure  M SD   M  SD     M  SD    F 
(2,116) 
 p 
         
Importance 3.98a 2.37 5.77b 1.35 6.22b 1.24 18.97 .000 
 
Live up to 
            
4.32a 
                
2.08 
            
5.38b 
         
 1.46 
            
6.10b 
             
1.02 
          
12.64 
























3.78a 1.63 4.82b 1.49 4.71b 1.63 5.10 .008 
Positive  
 
4.20a 1.89 5.37b 1.28 3.15c 1.57 18.68 .000 
Negative  3.02a 1.97 2.95a 3.36 4.51b 1.65 5.42 .006 
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SA-mistake conditions (all p <.01). The SA-mistake condition rated themselves as 
significantly more self-critical than the control condition (p =.005) but not than the SA- 
standard condition (p =.09). The control condition rated themselves as significantly less 
self-compassionate than the SA-mistake (p=.026) and SA-standard (p =.013) conditions. 
The SA-mistake condition rated their experience as significantly less positive than the 
control condition (p =.011), who rated it as significantly less positive compared to the SA-
standard condition (p =.005). Finally, the SA-mistake condition rated their experience as 
significantly more negative than the control and the SA-standard conditions (p =.016 and p 
=.013, respectively). 
General Distress and State Self-Compassion  
There was a significant difference between conditions on the SUDS, F (2, 118) 
=5.78, p =.004. The SA-mistake condition was significantly more distressed (see Table 6) 
compared to both the SA-standard condition and the control condition (p =.009 and p = 
.014, respectively). There was no significant difference between the SA-standard condition 
and the control condition (p=.98). 
State self-compassion was measured across conditions to determine whether they 
differed in how self-compassionate they were in that moment. Participants did not 
significantly differ in levels of state self-compassion based on condition, F (2, 118) = .73, p 
=.48. The S-SCS was comprised of positive (e.g. “I am trying to keep my emotions in 
balance”) and negative (e.g. “I am consumed by feelings of inadequacy”) items. A 
MANOVA was run to determine whether conditions differed in levels of state self-
compassion based on valence subscale. The model was significant, F (2,118) = 2.68, p = 
.03, η2 = .043. There was a significant difference between condition in how self-  
 
48 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
Table 6 
General Distress and State Self-Compassion by Condition 
     Control SA-standard   SA-mistake   
Measure  M SD     M  SD   M  SD    F 
(2,118) 
 p 
         
SUDS 24.34a 25.19 23.13a 27.00 41.88b 30.95   5.78 .004 
 
S-SCS 






    
6.41       




              
  0.73 




Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; S-SCS = State Self-Compassion Scale; 
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compassionately they responded on the positive subscale (p = .05), not the negative 
subscale (p = .15). The difference found on the positive subscale was driven by the SA-
mistake condition, who showed significantly higher levels of state self-compassion 
compared to the control condition (M = 23.46, SD = 5.12 and M = 20.59, SD = 5.92, 
respectively), but not compared to the SA-standard condition (M = 21.69, SD = 4.74). 
There was no statistically significant difference between conditions in state self-
compassion on the negative subscale. The SA-standard condition did not significantly 
differ from the SA-mistake or control condition on either subscale.  
Affective States Measure  
 A MANOVA was run to see whether conditions differed in the affective states. The 
MANOVA was significant, F (2,118) = 2.59, p <.001. Overall, the conditions significantly 
differed on the following affective states: love, joy, giving, empathic, connected, sympathy, 
grateful, proud, content, clear, vulnerable, critical, selfish, scared, and sad (all p < .05; see 
Table 7). They did not significantly differ in how humble, confused and angry they felt (all 
p > .05). 
Certain affective states are of particular relevance to self-affirmation. For example, 
feelings of love and connection pertain to the self-transcendence perspective of self-
affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants in the SA-standard condition felt 
significantly higher feelings of love than did those in the SA-mistake condition (p=.004) 
and control condition (p=.025), and they felt more connected compared to the SA-mistake 
condition and control conditions (both p <.001). Self-affirmation has also been suggested 
as a means to reduce self-criticism (Creswell et al, 2007). Participants in the SA-mistake 
condition did feel significantly more critical compared to the SA condition (p =.01) and  
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Table 7 
Affect Measure Items by Condition 
         Control SA-standard SA-mistake   
 
 
Measure  M SD     M  SD     M  SD    F 
(2,112) 
 p 
         
Love 2.78a 1.65 3.92b 1.08 3.10a 1.48 6.43 .002 
 
Joy 
            
2.81a 
             
1.63 
            
3.76b 
         
0.91 
            
2.28a 
                
1.40 
       
12.18 























2.59a 1.50 3.53b 1.11 2.58a 1.20 6.94 .001 
Connected 
 
2.78a 1.55 4.05b 0.96 2.78a 1.23 12.90 .000 
Sympathy  
 
2.24a 1.26 3.11b 1.27 2.75ab 1.28 4.38 .015 
Grateful 
 
2.89a 1.56 4.24b 1.03 3.25a 1.43 9.96 .000 
Proud  
 
2.57a 1.39 4.18b 1.06 2.68a 1.46 18.00 .000 
Content  
 
2.76a 1.34 3.95b 0.96 2.63a 1.31 13.71 .000 
Clear 
 
2.62a 1.21 3.61b 1.05 2.72a 1.34 7.60 .001 
Vulnerable 
 
2.05a 1.29 2.55ab 1.41 3.00b 1.41 4.56 .012 
Critical 
 
2.24a 1.28 2.24a 1.28 3.13b 1.29 6.22 .003 
Humble 
 
2.54a 1.33 3.11b 1.18 2.98ab 1.17 2.19 .117 
Selfish 
 
1.35a 0.75 1.74a 1.03 2.30b 1.36 7.45 .001 
Scared 
 
1.46a 1.04 2.05ab 1.29 2.35b 1.43 4.87 .009 
Sad 
 
1.70a 1.13 2.03a 1.17 2.70b 1.29 6.98 .001 
Confused 
 
1.57 .93 1.87 1.10 2.10 1.26 2.23 .112 
Angry  1.54a 1.10 1.61a 1.00 2.08b 1.31 2.53 .084 
Note: Means in the same row that do not share subscripts are significantly different 
(p<.05).  
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control condition (p =.008); the SA-standard and control conditions did not differ from one 
another in how critical they felt. Self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) appeals to the drive to 
maintain “self-integrity” and positive self-regard; therefore, it is possible people who have 
self-affirmed may feel more proud. The SA-standard condition rated themselves as 
significantly more proud than the SA-mistake condition and control condition (both p 
<.001). Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to increase various forms of happiness 
(Nelson et al., 2014) and the SA-standard condition did rate themselves as feeling more 
“joy” and “content” compared to SA-mistake and control conditions. 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, the “mistake” self-affirmation (SA-mistake) manipulation led to 
higher distress and worse overall affect compared to the standard self-affirmation 
manipulation. The SA-mistake condition showed significantly more distress than both the 
SA-standard condition and the control condition, who did not differ from one another. It is  
not merely writing about a mistake that was distressing, as the control group did not feel 
more distressed than the SA-standard group. Writing about a mistake within a domain that 
is valuable in one’s life is likely to be much more bothersome than writing about a mistake 
in a domain that is unimportant. 
Despite these differences, it is interesting that both the self-affirmation conditions 
(standard and mistake) rated themselves as more self-compassionate than the control 
condition (using the manipulation check items). Neff (2003b) found that self-compassion is 
most relevant during times of shame and self-criticism. Although both the control and the 
SA-mistake condition discuss a mistake which is likely to invoke such feelings as shame  
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and self-criticism, perhaps it is stronger when discussing a mistake in a personally relevant 
domain. The control group, who discussed a mistake in an unimportant value, did not feel 
that they wrote about their mistake self-compassionately. Further, the SA-standard 
manipulation, in which one doesn’t discuss a mistake, but just discusses experiences within 
an important value, also felt that they wrote about their experiences more self-
compassionately. This suggests that there could be something about discussing important 
values that invokes a sense of self-compassion, at least self-perceived self-compassion.  
Although the SA-standard and SA-mistake conditions perceived themselves to have been 
more self-compassionate, they did not show higher scores on the state S-SCS. None of the 
three conditions significantly differed in their levels of state self-compassion. Neff et al. 
(2020) published a state self-compassion scale; however, when conducting the present 
study, there was no official state self-compassion scale and so it was modified from the 
SCS – short form (Neff, 2003a). It was modified to be general enough for participants to 
respond to having written about a memorable experience and a mistake. Initially, it was 
surprising that the SA-standard condition, who wrote about a memorable experience, did 
not have higher feelings of state self-compassion than the SA-mistake condition and 
control condition, who wrote about mistakes. The difficulty lies in the fact that the scale 
was developed to be answered within the context of a mistake, as that is when self-
compassion is most relevant. It was likely difficult for the SA-standard condition to 
respond to statements such as “when thinking back on my experience, I am trying to see 
my flaws as part of the human condition” and “when thoughts about my experience upset 
me, I try to keep my emotions in balance” given that these are most likely irrelevant when 
thinking about a memorable experience in your top-rated value, rather than a mistake.  
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In line with this possibility, when breaking down the S-SCS into positive and negative 
subscales, there was a statistically significant difference found on the positive subscale, and 
this difference was driven by the SA-mistake condition. The SA-mistake condition had 
significantly higher scores of state self-compassion on the positive subscale compared to 
the control condition. There were no differences in state self-compassion found between 
the SA-standard condition and either the SA-mistake or control condition, suggesting that 
they may have found it difficult to respond to items tailored to measure feelings towards a 
mistake. 
Certain affective states are worth discussing given their relevance to self-
affirmation. For example, the self-transcendence perspective of self-affirmation claims that 
self-affirmation works through making one feel more love and connection to others 
(Crocker et al., 2008; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants in the SA-standard condition 
felt significantly higher feelings of love and significantly more connected than did those in 
the SA-mistake condition and control condition. Both the SA-mistake and control condition 
wrote about mistakes; this exercise likely does not foster feelings of love and connection 
the way writing about memorable experiences in important values would. This is an 
important divergence that the SA-mistake manipulation makes from a standard self-
affirmation manipulation and suggests that it may be fundamentally different. It is 
important to note here that although self-compassion manipulations are also conducted in 
the context of a mistake and do foster feelings of connection (Akin & Akin, 2015), they are 
directly prompted to discuss ways in which others have shared similar experiences 
(common humanity), which would foster such feelings. 
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Self-affirmation has also been suggested as a means to reduce self-criticism 
(Creswell et al, 2007; Bucchianeri & Corning, 2012). In line with the literature, the SA-
standard condition reported feeling less critical on the Affect Scale compared to the SA-
mistake condition. Further, the SA-mistake condition rated themselves as significantly 
more critical than the control condition, suggesting that writing about a mistake in an 
important value (SA-mistake) would lead to more critical feelings than would writing about 
a mistake in an unimportant value (control condition). Similarly, when looking at the 
manipulation check item regarding how self-critical participants perceived themselves to be 
when writing about their ‘experience’, the SA-mistake condition did indicate that they felt 
more self-critical than the control condition, although surprisingly they did not perceive 
themselves as more self-critical compared to the SA-standard condition.  
The feeling “pride” was of interest, as self-affirmation appeals to the drive to 
maintain “self-integrity” and positive self-regard (Steele, 1988). As expected, the SA-
standard condition rated themselves as significantly more proud than the SA-mistake 
condition and control condition. These findings suggest that writing about the value in the 
standard manipulation worked to maintain self-integrity, as expected, whereas writing 
about a mistake did not. 
Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to increase various forms of ‘happiness’ 
(i.e. hedonic and eudaimonic; Nelson et al., 2014). Similarly, the SA-standard group rated 
themselves as significantly more “joyful” and “content” on the Affect Scale compared to 
the SA-mistake and control conditions.  
Given that the SA-mistake condition seemed to differ in some theoretically 
important ways from the SA-standard condition, the focus of study three was to assess 
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whether a standard values-affirmation manipulation would reduce anticipatory anxiety. We 
decided to re-run study one using a standard values-affirmation condition to get a more 
accurate picture on whether self-affirmation reduces anticipatory anxiety, and whether it 
does so by increasing state self-compassion.  
Study Three  
Study three compared a standard values-affirmation condition to a control condition 
on levels of anticipatory anxiety pertaining to an upcoming speech task. We did not include 
a self-compassion manipulation in study three because we wanted to test an authentic 
values-affirmation, not in the context of a mistake. Given self-compassion is most relevant 
in the context of a mistake, we felt that it led to too many discrepancies between 
conditions. Instead, we chose to focus on just values-affirmation and to see whether state 
self-compassion was a mechanism of change. We hypothesized that a standard values-
affirmation manipulation would lead to reduced anticipatory anxiety due to increased state 
self-compassion. This time, participants were preselected for high versus low social anxiety 
in order to explore whether a self-affirmation manipulation is more effective for those with 
high social anxiety, compared to those with low social anxiety. It was hypothesized that, 
just as self-compassion has been found to be especially effective for those with high social 
anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), self-affirmation would similarly be more effective 
for this group. Therefore, it was expected that there would be an interaction between 
anxiety level and condition such that the high social anxiety group would report lower 
levels of anticipatory anxiety when in the self-affirmation condition compared to the 
control condition, but the low social anxiety group would report similar levels of 
anticipatory anxiety regardless of condition. Further, it was hypothesized that state self- 
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Figure 3. 
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compassion would mediate the effect of self-affirmation on reduced anticipatory 
anxiety for those with high social anxiety (see Figure 3). 
Method 
Participants 
There were 209 undergraduate students that participated in the study. Thirty-eight 
participants were excluded due to being suspicious about the nature of the study. 
Specifically, they were not convinced they had to give the speech (the anxiety induction). It  
is suspected that the participants’ friends who had taken the first study may have told them 
they wouldn’t have to give the speech, leading to a high exclusion rate for the third study.  
This left a total of 171 participants between the ages of 17 and 27 (average age 18.49, 84% 
female; 70.2% White, 12.9% Asian, 4.7% Black, 11% other) enrolled in a psychology 
course at Wilfrid Laurier University that participated in this study. Participants were 
preselected for high social anxiety using standard cut-offs (SPIN = 30 and SIAS = 34; 
Harwood & Kocovski, 2017; n = 78) or low social anxiety (SPIN = 10 or SIAS = 19; n = 
93). They were randomly assigned to either complete a self-affirmation writing exercise (n 
= 82) or a control writing exercise (n = 89). The participants received 1.0 credit towards 
their course grade for partaking in this study. 
Materials 
The baseline measures used were the SPIN, SIAS, one-item depression scale, SCS 
and a one-item Self-Esteem scale. These were all the same as what was used in study one, 
with the exception of the one-item depression scale (this item replaced the BDI). The same 
outcome measures were also used as in study one: SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ and modified S-
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SCS. An additional measure was used to examine state self-compassion: The Feelings of 
State Self-Compassion Scale.  
Single Depression Item. A one-item depression scale was used: “I feel depressed”. 
Participants responded to this statement on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me à 7 = 
very true of me). 
State Self-Compassion Scale. The same modified state self-compassion scale from 
study one was used as the primary measure of state self-compassion.  
Feelings of State Self-Compassion. The Feelings of State Self-Compassion Scale 
(FSSC; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014) is a seven-item measure borrowed from Lindsay and 
Creswell concerning feelings related to self-compassion. Participants are asked to rank how 
much they feel 7 affective states towards themselves leading up to their speech (1 = not at 
all à 7 = extremely). The states are: critical, sympathetic, grateful, trusting, vulnerable, 
joyful, and loving. A total score is calculated by adding each individual item’s score (items 
1 and 5 are reverse-scored). This measure was added as a secondary measure of state self-
compassion. Whereas the S-SCS is modified from the SCS (Neff, 2003a) and taps into the 
three constructs of self-compassion (self-kindness, common humanity, and mindfulness) 
the FSSC taps into other theoretically relevant feelings. The FSSC was created by Lindsay 
and Creswell (2014) to determine whether a self-affirmation induction led to an increase in 
present-moment feelings that are theoretically associated with self-compassion. Unlike the 
modified state self-compassion scale, the FSSC is more vague and does not probe into how 
self-compassionate participants were in specific ways while preparing for their speech.  
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Manipulation check. The manipulation check consisted of one brief statement that 
participants responded to on a 7-point Likert scale: “what I wrote about was very important 
to me” (1= not at all importantà 7 = extremely important).  
Procedure (see Appendix C) 
 Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better understand thought 
processes surrounding important values. Baseline measures (depression, self-compassion) 
were administered to ensure that there were no baseline differences between conditions. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to the self-affirmation manipulation or a 
control condition, creating a total of four conditions: 1) high social anxiety/self-affirmation 
manipulation (n = 36); 2) high social anxiety/control (n = 42); 3) low social anxiety/self-
affirmation manipulation (n = 46); and 4) low social anxiety/control (n = 47).  
Self-affirmation manipulation. The self-affirmation manipulation was a standard 
values-affirmation used in previous research (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Participants were 
instructed to rank a set of values from 1 (most important) to 13 (least important). The 
values were: artistic skills, sense of humor, relationships with friends/family, 
spontaneity/living live in the moment, social skills, athletics, musical ability/appreciation, 
physical attractiveness, creativity, academic skills, romance, religion, and other. They were 
then asked to complete a writing exercise discussing their top-ranked value. Specifically, 
the instructions read: “Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – 
ranked number 1). Describe why this value is important to you and how it has made you 
feel good about yourself.”  
Control condition. The control condition was intended to account for any effects 
resulting from writing about a value, but without any aspect of self-affirmation.  The 
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control condition received the same instructions to rank the set of 13 values; however, they 
were instructed to write about their bottom ranked value. Specifically, the instructions read: 
“Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 13). 
Describe why you think this value might be important to somebody else.” 
Following the self-affirmation manipulation phase, there was a brief manipulation 
check regarding how important the value that they wrote about was to them. All 
participants then underwent an anxiety induction, which was implemented through a three-
minute impromptu speech task.  Participants were told the following: “You will be taking 
part in a study that examines how people talk about their personal values in job interviews. 
This is an important topic because research has shown that performance in interviews is 
correlated with whether applicants are offered the position.  In addition, how well people 
perform in mock job interview situations is highly predictive of how well they typically 
perform in real life and whether they will obtain future jobs. Please discuss how your 
personal values make you a desirable employee.” Participants were told they would be 
speaking in front of the group (ranging from 1-5 people, depending on how full the 
research slot is). 
 Following the anxiety induction, participants were asked to complete the SUDS, 
STAI-S, and ASBQ to assess anticipatory anxiety. They also completed two measures of 
state self-compassion – the FSSC, and the S-SCS. Upon completion of these measures, 
participants were told that they were not actually required to give the speech.  
Data Analysis  
A 2 (high social anxiety vs. low social anxiety) x 2 (self-affirmation vs. control) 
MANOVA was conducted to determine whether there was any effect of the independent 
 
61 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
variables (social anxiety and self-affirmation manipulation) on the dependent variables 
(anticipatory anxiety and state self-compassion). Further, mediation analyses were run to 
explore whether self-affirmation increases state self-compassion, which in turn decreases 
state anxiety. Three moderated mediation models were tested using Hayes Process to 
determine whether self-affirmation decreases anticipatory anxiety by increasing state self-
compassion, and whether this is moderated by social anxiety type (X = Condition; M = 
State Self-Compassion; Y = SUDS/STAI-S/ASBQ; W = Social Anxiety Type).  
Results 
Baseline Measures 
Participants’ social anxiety, depression, SC and self-esteem were measured across 
conditions. There were no significant baseline differences found on the SIAS, SPIN, SCS, 
depression scale or self-esteem scale, (all F < 1; see Table 8). 
Manipulation Check  
Participants in the self-affirmation condition were asked to pick an important value 
to discuss whereas participants in the control were asked to speak about their least 
important value. A manipulation check was conducted to determine how important the 
value they chose to write about was to them. There was a significant difference between 
conditions, F (1, 167) = 428.59, p< .001, η2 = .72, such that those in the self-affirmation 
condition rated their value as significantly more important than those in the control 
condition (M = 6.65, SD = .84 and M = 2.55, SD = 1.58, respectively).   
Effect of Condition on Anticipatory Anxiety and State Self-Compassion by Social 
Anxiety Level 
A 2 (social anxiety type: high vs. low) x 2 (condition: self-affirmation vs. control)  
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Table 8 
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MANOVA was run using the SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ, FSSC and state SCS as dependent 
variables. The MANOVA revealed a main effect of social anxiety type, F (5, 162) = 20.90,  
p < .001, η2 = .39. Those with high social anxiety (HSA) responded to the speech task with 
higher levels of anticipatory anxiety compared to those with low social anxiety (LSA). 
Those with HSA also had lower levels of state self-compassion compared to those with 
LSA, as depicted by their lower scores on the S-SCS and FSSC (both p <.001). There was 
also a main effect of condition, F (5, 162) = 2.40, p = .04, η2 = .07, such that those in the  
self-affirmation condition responded to the speech task with lower levels of anxiety 
compared to the control condition (p = .04). The interaction effect was not significant, F (5, 
162) = 1.1, p = .36, η2 = .03.  
 Univariate analyses revealed a significant difference between the LSA group and 
the HSA group on the SUDS, F (3, 166) = 63.83, p < .001, η2 = .28, STAI-S, F (3, 166) = 
79.93, p < .001, η2 = .33, ASBQ, F (3, 166) = 65.11, p < .001, η2 = .28, FSSC, F (3, 166) = 
31.95 p < .001, η2 = .16, and S-SCS, F (3, 166) = 74.47, p < .001, η2 = .31. Those with high 
social anxiety scored higher than those with low social anxiety on the SUDS, STAI-S, and 
the ASBQ (see Table 9). Those with high social anxiety scored lower than those with low 
social anxiety on the FSSC and the S-SCS. 
The main effect of condition was driven by the differences between the self-
affirmation and the control condition on the ASBQ, F (1, 166) = 5.27, p < .02. Those in the 
control condition showed higher levels of anticipatory processing than those in the self-
affirmation condition. Conditions did not differ significantly on the remaining measures 
(SUDS, STAI-S, FSSC, and S-SCS; p = .24, p = .24, p = .34, and p = .17, respectively); 
however, the pattern of results was similar to the ASBQ on most other measures.    
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Table 9. 
Anticipatory Anxiety and Self-Compassion Measures by Condition and Anxiety Group 
Note. HSA = high social anxiety. LSA = low social anxiety. SUDS = Subjective Units of 
Distress. STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State Version. ASBQ = Anticipatory 
Social Behaviours Questionnaire. FSSC = Feeling of State Self-Compassion. S-SCS = 
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The interaction effect between social anxiety and condition was not significant at 
the multivariate level; however, there were two measures that were approaching 
significance at the univariate level. The STAI-S was approaching significance, F (1, 166) = 
3.27, p = .07, η2 = .02, and showed an interesting pattern of results. For those with low 
social anxiety (LSA), the self-affirmation condition showed lower levels of state anxiety 
compared to the control condition; for those with high social anxiety (HSA), their anxiety  
levels did not differ between self-affirmation and control condition.  The S-SCS depicted a 
similar pattern, F (1, 166) = 2.60, p = .11, η2 = .02. For the LSA group, there were higher 
rates of state self-compassion in the self-affirmation condition than the control condition; 
for the HSA group, there was no difference in levels of state self-compassion between the 
self-affirmation and control condition. 
Self-Compassion as a Mediator 
The hypothesized self-compassion mediation model was tested in two interlinked 
steps. First, a simple mediation model was run to see whether the self-affirmation condition 
increased state self-compassion, which in turn decreased state anxiety. Next, social anxiety 
was integrated into the model to see whether participants’ level of social anxiety had a 
significant moderating effect on the model. It was hypothesized that self-affirmation would 
reduce anticipatory anxiety through increasing state self-compassion and that this effect 
would only be significant for those with high social anxiety, not low social anxiety.   
Six simple mediation models were tested using condition as the independent variable, one 
of two measures of state self-compassion (FSSC, S-SCS) as the mediator, and one of three 
measures of anticipatory anxiety as the dependent variable (SUDS, STAI-S, ASBQ). The 
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models were not significant with either S-SCS as the mediator (p = .12, p = .14, p = .14) or 
FSSC (p = .55, p = .47, p = .47) as the mediator. 
To examine the hypothesized effect of social anxiety as a moderator, three 
moderated mediation models (Haye’s Process, model 8) were run using social anxiety type 
as the moderator. The moderated mediation models (see Figures 4, 5, 6) showed that those 
in the self-affirmation condition had significantly higher levels of state self-compassion (S-
SCS), which in turn decreased anticipatory anxiety, and this was moderated by  
participants’ level of social anxiety, such that this effect was only present for those with 
LSA, not for those with HSA. Interestingly, the direct path from condition to anticipatory 
anxiety was not significant, so it seems that state self-compassion accounted for the effect 
that condition had on reducing anxiety. Moreover, social anxiety moderated this effect, 
depicted by the fact that the moderated mediation model was significant while the simple 
mediation model was not. 
Writing Valence, Writing Quantity, and Chosen Value 
To help understand why the self-affirmation manipulation was effective for the 
LSA group but not the HSA group, we coded the data for several things. Firstly, we looked 
at how positively/negatively participants wrote in their writing exercise in case people with  
HSA were more negative and perhaps the self-affirmation was not able to over-ride the 
negativity (see Table 10). Two separate coders counted how many times participants wrote 
a positive or negative phrase (i.e. “I have always been good at music” or “I have never been 
very good at music so…”). A two-way random effect intra-class correlation (ICC)  
coefficient was used to determine the reliability of the coding method for how many  
positive and negative phrases participants wrote. Interrater reliability was moderate for  
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Figure 4.  
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Figure 5.  
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Figure 6.  
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Table 10 
Valence and Writing Engagement across Conditions and Social Anxiety Level 
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both positive and negative phrases, ICC = .66 and ICC = .62, respectively. The main effect 
of social anxiety type was not significant, showing that participants with HSA were not 
writing more negatively/less positively than the LSA group (p = .93). There was a main 
effect of condition (p = .000), such that those in the self-affirmation condition wrote more 
positively and less negatively than the control group, F (3, 167) = 35.27, p = .000.   
Next, we examined how much the participants wrote in two sections of the study: 1) 
the writing exercise (self-affirmation vs. control) and 2) the speech preparation  
page. It is possible that the self-affirmation condition was not effective for those with high 
social anxiety because they did not engage with the self-affirmation writing exercise to the 
same degree. The coders ranked their writing from 0-2 depending on how much they wrote 
(0 = very little, jot notes, without depth; 1 = several sentences, some depth; 2 = extensively 
wrote; with depth). Interrater reliability was good, ICC = .73.  A 2 (self-affirmation vs. 
control) x 2 (high social anxiety vs. low social anxiety) MANOVA was run, with the 
amount they wrote as part of the manipulation and the amount they wrote for speech 
preparation as the two dependent variables.  
The main effects of social anxiety type and condition were both significant (p = 
.002, p = .000), as was the interaction effect (p = .036). Looking at univariate analyses, the  
significant main effect of social anxiety type was based on how much they wrote in their 
speech task (p = .001), not how much they wrote regarding the manipulation (p = .354). 
The LSA group wrote more in their speech preparation than the HSA group; the LSA and 
HSA groups did not differ in how much they wrote in the manipulation writing task. The 
significant main effect of condition was based on how much they wrote in their writing 
exercise (p = .000), not how much they wrote in their speech preparation (p = .939). 
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Participants in the self-affirmation group wrote more in their manipulation writing exercise 
than those in the control group; the conditions did not differ in how much they wrote in 
their speech preparation. The interaction effect was based on how much they wrote in their 
speech (p = .019), but not how much they wrote as part of the manipulation writing task (p 
=.332). For the LSA group, participants in the self-affirmation condition wrote more in 
their speech preparation compared to the control condition; for the HSA group, participants 
in the self-affirmation condition wrote less during their speech preparation compared to the 
control condition. 
 Lastly, we looked at the value that participants ranked as their most important 
value. The most commonly top-ranked value was by far ‘relationships with family and 
friends’, with 61.9% of people ranking it as their #1 value. The second most common top-
ranked value was ‘social skills’, with 9.7% of people ranking it as their #1 value.  This 
means that a total of 71.6% of people’s top ranked value was a social value. Participants 
disproportionately selected ‘relationships with family and friends’ or ‘social skills’ 
regardless of their social anxiety type: for HSA, 63.6% selected ‘relationships with family 
and friends’ and 8.0% selected ‘social skills’; for LSA, 60.6% selected ‘relationships with 
family and friends’ and 11.0% selected ‘social skills’.  
Discussion 
Study three implemented a standard values-affirmation manipulation, not in the 
context of a mistake. In line with hypotheses there was a main effect of both social anxiety 
type and condition. Those with high social anxiety showed higher anticipatory anxiety and 
lower state self-compassion than those with low social anxiety. The self-affirmation 
condition had lower anticipatory anxiety (specifically, anticipatory processing) than the 
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control condition. The self-affirmation condition did not differ from the control condition 
in levels of state self-compassion.  
Although the interaction effect was not significant, results on two measures were 
approaching significance: the STAI-S (state anxiety) and S-SCS (state self-compassion), 
though in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. For those with low social 
anxiety, they had higher state anxiety and lower state self-compassion in the control group 
compared to the self-affirmation condition. For those with high social anxiety, there was no 
difference. The results on the SUDS (general distress) and the ASBQ (anticipatory 
processing) displayed the same pattern – for the low social anxiety group, they had higher 
distress and anticipatory processing in control compared to self-affirmation; for the high 
social anxiety group, their distress and anticipatory processing scores were almost the same 
across conditions. It seems that self-affirmation is actually more effective for those with 
low social anxiety and does not affect those with high social anxiety. 
The mediation analyses provided further support for this notion. Although the 
simple mediation models (X = condition; M = S-SCS; Y = SUDS/STAI-S/ASBQ) were not 
significant, the moderated mediation (W = social anxiety type) models were. The 
moderated mediation models depicted that for only the low social anxiety group, self-
affirmation reduced anticipatory anxiety, and this effect was mediated by state self-
compassion. 
These results are contrary to our hypotheses. We hypothesized an interaction effect 
in which the self-affirmation would be more effective for people with high social anxiety 
than people with low social anxiety, as we were hypothesizing a self-compassion account 
of self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), and self-compassion has been shown to be 
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more effective for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017). Instead, it 
appears that self-affirmation was only effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those 
with low social anxiety, and it had no effect for those with high social anxiety. So why was 
the self-affirmation manipulation ineffective for the HSA group?  
The self-affirmation manipulation does appear to have worked, as people with low 
social anxiety showed lower anticipatory anxiety towards the upcoming speech task in the 
self-affirmation condition compared to the control condition. Therefore, there must be an 
explanation as to why the self-affirmation was not helpful for those with high social 
anxiety. To further investigate these results, two research assistants coded the participants’ 
manipulation writing exercises and speech preparation. Firstly, they coded for how 
positively/negatively participants wrote in their writing exercise. We speculated that people 
with high social anxiety may have written more negatively throughout their writing 
exercise, dulling any effect of self-affirmation; however, we did not find support for this. 
The HSA group did not write more negatively or less positively than the LSA group. One 
limitation worth noting is that the interrater reliability was only ‘moderate’ for the 
positive/negative phrase count in participants’ writing exercise. 
Next, we looked at how much participants wrote for their writing exercise and 
speech preparation task, and inter-rater reliability was good for this coding. How much 
people wrote in their manipulation writing exercise was of particular interest, to explore 
whether the HSA group was not engaging with the self-affirmation task to the extent the 
LSA group was. Once again, we did not find support for this. There was a main effect of 
social anxiety level, such that the LSA group wrote more in their speech preparation task 
compared to the HSA group; however, the LSA group did not write more in the 
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manipulation writing exercise compared to the HSA group. There was a main effect of 
condition, such that the self-affirmation condition wrote more in their manipulation writing 
exercise than the control condition; the conditions did not differ in how much they wrote in 
their speech preparation. The interaction effect showed that for the LSA group, the self-
affirmation condition wrote more in their speech preparation compared to the control 
condition. Interestingly, we found the opposite to be true for the HSA group – they actually 
wrote less in their speech preparation in the self-affirmation condition compared to the 
control condition. It appears as though the self-affirmation manipulation was specifically 
unhelpful for those with high social anxiety. 
The unhelpful nature of the self-affirmation task among those with high social 
anxiety may be due to the values that participants selected to write about. Past research has 
shown that participants often rank a social aspect as their top-rated value (Crocker et al., 
2008). Similarly, the value most participants chose to write about in the current research 
was relationships with friends and family (61.9%), an area in which people with high social 
anxiety are likely to feel incompetent. People with social anxiety disorder experience fewer 
positive emotions during everyday social interactions (Kashdan et al., 2013) and more 
anxiety and negative predictions about social events even during positive social encounters 
(Alden et al., 2008). People with high social anxiety also feel less competent in their social 
life (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Clark, 2001). The purpose of self-affirmation is to boost 
feelings of self-adequacy to protect against psychological threat; however, discussing a 
social value is not likely to boost feelings of self-adequacy for people with high social 
anxiety, despite it being an important value to them. A discussion of directions for future 
research to address this issue follows in the general discussion.  
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General Discussion  
Mindfulness-based and values-based strategies have been offered as a way to 
improve the success rate of treatment for anxiety disorders (Hayes et al., 2012).  The 
current research explored two related concepts: self-compassion and self-affirmation 
(specifically, a values-affirmation). A values-affirmation was of particular interest to us 
given the prominence of values in current therapies for social anxiety disorder (i.e. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy).  
Self-compassion was previously found to be especially effective in reducing 
anticipatory anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017).  The 
current research aimed to build on this previous study and the Lindsay and Creswell (2014) 
study, by exploring whether a self-affirmation manipulation would also be effective in 
reducing anticipatory anxiety, and whether this effect would be mediated by state self-
compassion and therefore be more effective for those with high social anxiety. Study one 
compared three conditions (self-compassion, self-affirmation, and control) in levels of 
anticipatory anxiety towards an upcoming speech task. Study two compared the modified 
self-affirmation manipulation used in study one to a standard self-affirmation manipulation. 
The third and final study compared a standard self-affirmation manipulation to a control 
condition on anticipatory anxiety as in study one; however, this time participants were 
preselected for high versus low social anxiety so that any differences between these groups 
could be examined.  
In study one, a self-affirmation, self-compassion and control group were compared 
in their anticipatory anxiety related to an upcoming speech task. The self-affirmation and 
self-compassion manipulations were each modified slightly to be as consistent with one 
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another as possible. More specifically, the self-affirmation manipulation asked participants 
to recall a mistake (as self-compassion manipulations commonly draw on a mistake), and 
the self-compassion manipulation was in the context of their top-rated value (just as a 
standard self-affirmation manipulation is). It was hypothesized that both the self-
compassion and self-affirmation condition would have lower anticipatory anxiety 
compared to the control condition, and that this would be due to an increase in state self-
compassion. 
We did not find support for our hypotheses in study one. The control condition had 
higher baseline levels of social anxiety and lower baseline levels of self-compassion 
compared to the self-compassion condition. After controlling for these baseline differences, 
there were no significant differences in anticipatory anxiety between the self-compassion, 
self-affirmation and control condition. Moreover, the mediation analysis was not 
significant after controlling for baseline differences, showing that there was no mediated 
effect of condition on state self-compassion and subsequently on lower anticipatory 
anxiety. We speculate that this may come down to the method used to implement self-
affirmation. Participants were asked to recall a mistake (as opposed to the traditional 
‘experience’) that they had made within the domain of their top-rated value, prior to 
discussing in full why this value is important to them. To discuss a mistake is likely to be 
distressing, not affirming, and may take away the legitimacy of a self-affirmation 
manipulation. This was addressed in study two.  
The modified manipulation may have been the cause behind the other unexpected 
finding: that those with low social anxiety, rather than high social anxiety, actually 
appeared to benefit more from the self-compassion induction. A moderation analysis was 
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run to determine whether people respond differently to the self-compassion or self-
affirmation conditions based on their baseline levels of social anxiety. Contrary to 
hypotheses, this model showed that for those with low social anxiety (and not for those 
with moderate or high social anxiety), a self-compassion induction reduced general distress 
compared to a control group. Once again, there was no difference between self-affirmation 
and control condition at any level of social anxiety. The fact that the self-compassion 
condition led to lower anticipatory anxiety compared to control for those with low social 
anxiety was surprising, given that previous research found self-compassion to reduce 
anticipatory anxiety more among those with high social anxiety, and not low (Harwood & 
Kocovski, 2017). The difference may be in the manipulation used. In the current research, 
participants were asked to discuss a mistake within their most important value, whereas 
typical self-compassion inductions have participants discuss a mistake more generally, not 
relating to their most important value. It is possible that discussing a mistake in the context 
of one’s most important value is much more distressing than a mistake made in everyday 
life. The self-compassion manipulation in the context of a mistake was still effective for 
those with low social anxiety; however, people with high social anxiety have been shown 
to respond to stressful social situations with symptoms characteristic of those with PTSD 
(Erwin et al., 2006), including re-experiencing, avoidance, and hyper-arousal. Perhaps 
discussing a mistake in the context of their most important value was especially triggering 
for those with high social anxiety.  
Study two compared levels of general distress and affect across three conditions: a 
standard self-affirmation (SA-standard), a self-affirmation in the context of a mistake (SA-
mistake), and a control group.  It was hypothesized that the modified self-affirmation 
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manipulation (SA-mistake) would lead to higher distress and overall worse affect compared 
to the standard self-affirmation manipulation, and therefore would not be a fair 
representation of self-affirmation. Self-affirmation aims to boost self-integrity (Steele, 
1988), and a typical values-affirmation exercise is not framed within the context of a 
mistake. The goal in modifying the values-affirmation in study one was to keep it as 
consistent as possible with the self-compassion condition (which is often done in the 
context of shame or self-criticism, such as a mistake; e.g., Harwood & Kocovski, 2017); 
however, in retrospect, it seems obvious that writing about an experience that invokes 
shame will do just the opposite of boosting self-integrity. It is quite possible that self-
affirmation would have reduced anticipatory anxiety, as hypothesized, had we used a fair 
representation of self-affirmation.  
Study two confirmed that the SA-mistake and SA-standard manipulations were 
dissimilar. When done in the context of a mistake, the self-affirmation writing exercise led 
to higher levels of distress and lower positive affect/higher negative affect. While it is 
argued that mood or affect are not the mechanism behind self-affirmation’s effects 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006), several of the specific items are still theoretically relevant. The 
affective states that were looked at in more detail due to their link to self-affirmation are: 
“pride”, “critical”, “love”, “connected” and “joyful”/“content”.  
In general, self-affirmation refers to cognitive events that support a global sense of 
self-integrity (Steele, 1988). According to self-affirmation theory, discussing important 
values boost self-integrity and overall self-regard, which reduces defensiveness. When self-
affirmed, participants have also been shown to have positive self-feelings (Lindsay & 
Creswell, 2014). In the current study, participants in the SA-standard condition felt more 
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“proud” compared to the SA-mistake condition and control condition. This is further 
relevant if self-compassion is a mechanism of effect underlying self-affirmation, as self-
compassion also predicts positive affective states, and positively correlates to self-worth 
(Neff & Vonk, 2009). Self-affirmation also leads to decreased levels of self-criticism 
(Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). The SA-mistake condition showed significantly higher levels 
of self-criticism compared to the SA-standard condition and the control condition. The 
third and fourth affective state worth mentioning are “love” and “connected”. Recall the 
two main theoretical perspectives on self-affirmation: transcending-self perspective and 
self-resources perspective. The transcending-self perspective states that self-affirmation 
enables one to transcend one’s own image concerns by increasing outward-focused 
feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). In line with the transcending-self perspective of self-
affirmation, studies have found self-affirmation to lead participants to show increased 
feelings of love and connectedness (Crocker et al., 2008; Lindsay & Creswell, 2014). Study 
two replicated this finding, with the SA-standard manipulation having higher self-perceived 
feelings of ‘love’ and ‘connected’ than the SA-mistake condition and the control condition. 
Finally, self-affirmation has been shown to improve both hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being (“happiness”; Nelson et al., 2014). In line with this, the SA-standard group rated 
themselves as feeling significantly more “joyful” and “content” than the SA-mistake and 
control conditions. The results from study two led to the decision to re-run the first study 
using a true values-affirmation condition.  
Study three compared a standard self-affirmation condition and a control condition 
on levels of anticipatory anxiety and state self-compassion. Participants were preselected 
for either high or low social anxiety so that these group’s response to the self-affirmation 
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condition could be compared. It was hypothesized that the self-affirmation condition would 
lead to lower anticipatory anxiety and that this effect would be mediated by increased state 
self-compassion. It was further hypothesized that this effect would only be significant for 
those with high social anxiety.  
The results showed that those in the self-affirmation condition did have lower 
anticipatory anxiety compared to the control condition. The simple mediation model (with 
state self-compassion as the mediator) was not significant. However, the moderated 
mediation model (with social anxiety entered as a moderator) was significant; though, not 
in the direction we hypothesized.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the third study found that the self-affirmation 
manipulation was actually only effective for people with low social anxiety. This was 
similar to study one’s results, which showed that the self-compassion manipulation was 
only effective in reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety. Study 
three results showed no significant difference in anticipatory anxiety between conditions 
for those with high social anxiety. There are two plausible explanations for this finding. 
First of all, high social anxiety has been found to inhibit a promotion system in which 
people “pursue rewards and strive toward the fulfillment of hopes and aspirations” (Scholer 
et al. 2012), helping provide a sense of “life purpose”. Values are related to having a sense 
of purpose and as such, discussing values would not likely be beneficial for those not living 
up to these values and fulfilling their life purpose. Secondly, this study found that people 
typically wrote about social belonging or other social aspects: 61.9% said family and 
friends is their most important value; the next highest ranked value was social skills at 
9.7%. People with high social anxiety struggle to form and maintain fulfilling relationships 
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(e.g., Ledley et al., 2008), in part due to anxiety and avoidance behaviors that are engaged 
to evade predicted negative social experiences (Clark, 2001; Hofmann, 2007). People with 
high social anxiety are overall unlikely to feel competent within the domain of social 
relationships (e.g., Herbert & Dalrymple, 2005; Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007), and 
therefore, the self-affirmation is not likely to work in the same way it does for others – to 
boost their feelings of self-adequacy. Perhaps had we specified that they only write about 
something that is highly important to them and in which they feel competent we would 
have seen results reflective of self-affirmation. Instead, we asked them their most important 
value (to which most ranked relationships with family friends as #1) and then had them 
write about that specific value. Writing about a social value could instigate negative 
feelings for those with high social anxiety, as they are likely to hold numerous references 
of times when they did not live up to this value; for example, by avoiding a party due to 
predicted negative judgments. These cognitions would likely compete with, if not override 
altogether, the positive impact that self-affirmation manipulations typically have in the face 
of threat. 
Further, therapy focuses on relating the important value to the threat at hand (e.g., 
Kocovski et al, 2013; Kocovski et al, 2019; Arch et al., 2019). For example, somebody 
with social anxiety would bring their value of friendship to the forefront of their mind when 
attending a party that they would like to avoid. Focusing on why it is important, as opposed 
to their internal physical experiences, is a helpful tactic in motivating somebody to pursue 
valued living, even in the face of anxiety. Perhaps the current study should have had 
participants link their important value to the threatening situation at hand to better reflect 
the way values are used in therapy.  
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The mechanism of change in self-affirmation exercises is not well specified. There 
are two main theoretical perspectives regarding how self-affirmation works – the self-
resources perspective states that self-affirmation boosts one’s self-image for coping with 
threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), whereas the transcending-self perspective states that 
self-affirmation facilitates ones transcending self-image concerns by increasing other-
directed feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). Lindsay and Creswell (2014) proposed a self-
compassion account of self-affirmation, connecting the two perspectives. They theorized 
that: in regard to the self-resources perspective, the self-image boost is about feeling more 
compassion towards oneself (as opposed to a self-esteem boost); and in regard to the 
transcending-self perspective, the compassionate feelings generated by self-affirmation are 
self-focused (as opposed to other-focused). Their research supports this perspective, 
showing that self-affirmation led to increased prosocial behaviour, and it did so through 
increasing compassionate feelings towards oneself, which in turn promoted prosocial 
behaviour. A noteworthy contribution from the current research is that, just as Lindsay and 
Creswell (2014) found, there does appear to be a mediating role of state self-compassion on 
self-affirmation. For those with low social anxiety, the values-affirmation exercise led to 
reduced anticipatory anxiety and this was mediated by increased state self-compassion. The 
direct path of condition to anticipatory anxiety was not significant, while the indirect path 
(through state self-compassion) was significant.  
This research adds to the literature which has recognized that individuals differ in 
their vulnerability to the threat and these differences can serve as a significant moderator of 
self-affirmation effects (Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009). 
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Jessop et al. (2017) found that self-affirmation can actually exacerbate negative responses 
to stress under certain conditions. Their study focused on important life events that are 
characterized by low levels of control. They provided preliminary evidence that self-
affirmation may actually have detrimental effects on those who are most vulnerable. 
Specifically, they investigated an imagined stressful childbirth scenario; those with high 
fear of childbirth and low confidence actually had more negative affect following a self-
affirmation manipulation whereas those with low fear of childbirth and high confidence 
had more positive affect following a self-affirmation manipulation. Jessop et al. reasoned 
that self-affirmation may yield more negative results when defensive responses are actually 
advantageous (Sherman & Hartson, 2011), as self-affirmation lowers defensive responding. 
While we did not find self-affirmation to have a detrimental effect on those who are most 
vulnerable (the high social anxiety group), we did find that it was not helpful for them. 
Further, coding analyses hinted at a possible detrimental effect of self-affirmation on those 
with high social anxiety, as this group actually wrote less in their speech preparation 
following a self-affirmation manipulation compared to the control group. In contrast, the 
low social anxiety group, who benefitted from self-affirmation, wrote more in their speech 
preparation in the self-affirmation condition compared to the control group.  
Finally, it is possible that the values articulation exercise may not have been long 
enough, or substantial enough, to yield results in a highly anxious sample. Although brief 
writing tasks have been shown to be effective for those with high social anxiety in some 
cases (Harwood & Kocovski, 2017), other research has found that more substantial values 
exercises consisting of revisiting the task, or even daily reminders to consider one’s 
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personal values throughout their daily activities over a more extended period of time, may 
be necessary to alter anxiety levels in an anxious population (Tull et al., 2018). 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Implications 
This study suggests that a brief values exercise is not effective for people with high 
social anxiety; however, we did not work with a clinical sample and therefore this research 
cannot be generalized to this population. It is also reasonable to suggest values work be 
more relevant to the task or threat at hand (consistent with how values are used in therapy) 
in order for it to be successful in reducing anxiety for a highly anxious sample. Values are a 
useful tactic in therapy to motivate people towards values consistent living in the face of 
negative internal experiences, such as anxiety. Discussing values in general, without 
aiming to redirect focus on the values, as opposed to negative internal experiences (e.g., 
anxiety), may not be beneficial.  
Further, we did not measure how competent participants felt within their valued 
domain. This may have been a crucial factor in whether the values-affirmation was actually 
affirming, as it should be. For those with high social anxiety, discussing a social facet of 
life (i.e. relationships with friends and family or social skills) may have not been self-
affirming if they feel incompetent in their social life. Future research with a highly socially 
anxious population should specify that the value chosen be one that is not only important to 
them but also in a domain in which they feel competent.  
The current research implemented the values-affirmation prior to the ‘threat’ 
(speech task). Self-affirmation research within social psychology often puts the threat first, 
then allows one to buffer against it with a self-affirmation manipulation. In therapy, values 
articulations are implemented prior to any threats; therefore, we chose to put it prior to the 
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threat within this research as well, given our interest in the applicability of this research to 
the clinical side of psychology. The self-affirmation manipulation was still effective in 
reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with low social anxiety, showing that it still worked 
regardless of its placement. 
There was no existing, validated measure of state self-compassion at the time of 
designing these studies. We modified Neff’s (2003a) short form scale, and therefore it is 
possible the S-SCS did not measure what it intended to. As a secondary measure, we also 
borrowed the Feelings of State Self-Compassion Scale (FSSC) used by Lindsay and 
Creswell (2014), which include theoretically relevant items with self-compassion.  Future 
research should use Neff’s State Self-Compassion Scale – Long form (SSCS-L; Neff et al., 
2020) to further support the link between self-affirmation and state self-compassion.  
As of now, there is not a clear mechanism of effect underlying self-affirmation. 
Further, most research on self-affirmation has been done within social psychological 
phenomena, such as bias. As noted by Czech et al. (2011), future research would do well to 
further investigate mediators and moderators of self-affirmation on psychological stress. 
This would help to create a well-rounded picture of self-affirmation and contribute to 
further knowledge of how it exerts its effects. The current research provides evidence for a 
self-compassion account of self-affirmation, originally put forth by Lindsay and Creswell 
(2014). It seems as though, for some people, self-affirmation can have beneficial effects 
(e.g. increased prosocial behaviour; reduced anticipatory anxiety) that are explained by an 
increase in state self-compassion. This was shown in the research done by Lindsay and 
Creswell and is further evidenced in the current research.   
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Given that a self-compassion induction has been shown to be especially effective in 
reducing anticipatory anxiety for those with high social anxiety (Harwood & Kocovski, 
2017), and self-compassion may be one of the mechanisms of change underlying self-
affirmation, it is still possible that people with high social anxiety will be receptive to a 
self-affirmation induction, under the right conditions.  Further research is needed to clarify 
this. The values-affirmation exercise should be modified for this population to ensure they 
are not only speaking about something highly important to them, but also about a domain 
in which they feel competent. While many people undeniably value their relationships with 
family and friends, people with high social anxiety may still feel that they don’t thrive in 
social areas such as this, despite how much they value their social relationships. Instead, 
people with high social anxiety should be directed to write about something that is not only 
very important to them, but that they also feel competent in.  
To confirm whether values-affirmations are in fact only effective in reducing 
anxiety for those with low social anxiety, future values-affirmation manipulations should 
be less focused on matching the existing social psychology literature and more focused on 
being relevant to clinical psychology and therapy. Specifically, future research should 
examine a values articulation that a) is relevant to the threat at hand, as this is how values 
are often contextualized in therapy; and b) stipulates the value chosen be one that they feel 
competent in, rather than in an area in which they may feel especially inadequate. 
Despite finding results contrary to hypotheses, the current research tells an 
intriguing story and is suggestive of several noteworthy contributions. Firstly, modifying 
self-compassion inductions may alter their effect, and this may be especially true among 
specific, vulnerable populations. Secondly, a values-affirmation implemented among 
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certain populations may benefit from specifying that participants focus on a value that is 
not only important to them, but one in which they also feel competent. This is especially 
true for populations who may feel incompetent socially (such as those with high social 
anxiety), as it appears that people often choose a social domain as their top-rated value. 
Thirdly, this research contributes to the literature showing that self-affirmation 
manipulations may yield different results (or be ineffective altogether) for certain 
vulnerable populations (Harris & Napper, 2005; Harris et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009). 
Finally, the current research provides further support for the self-compassion account of 
self-affirmation (Lindsay & Creswell, 2014), as state self-compassion was found to mediate 
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Appendix A – Study 1 
 
                Self-Compassion Manipulation     
 
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you). Think about a time 
when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value. 
Self-Compassion:  
• Write a paragraph expressing kindness to yourself in the same way you might 
express kindness for someone close to you  
• List some of the ways in which other people have experienced similar events to the 
one you described.  
• List the emotions you felt during this event and explain (as objectively as possible) 
why you felt that emotion. 
 
        Self-affirmation Manipulation      
 
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1). 
Think about a time when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value. 
 
• Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this important 
value.  
• Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to 
you. 
• Explain in full why this value is important.  
• Identify your top two reasons why it’s important to you. 
• Identify how you have acted consistently with this value in the past. 
 
      Control      
 
Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12). 
Think about a time when you made a mistake pertaining to this important value. 
 
• Write a paragraph describing your role in this event.  
• Who else was involved in this event?  
• Describe your feelings about this event.  
• Explain in full why this value is important to others. 
• Identify your top two reasons why you think this value is important to others. 
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Manipulation Check 
Rate how much you agree with the following statement from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
 
1) The value I wrote about is very important to me. 
Not at all 
important 
     Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Modified State Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS) 
 
Think about how you feel in this moment while preparing for your speech.   
 










1. …I am consumed by feelings of 
inadequacy 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. …I am understanding and patient 
towards those aspects of myself I 
don’t like  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. …I am trying to take a balanced view 
of this situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. … I feel like most other people are 
less flawed than me 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. …I am trying to see my flaws as part 
of the human condition 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. … I am giving myself the caring I 
need 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. … I am trying to keep my emotions 
in balance 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. … I think about my inadequacies and 
feel alone in my failures 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. …I tend to obsess and fixate on 
everything that is wrong with my 
speech 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. … I am reminding myself that 
feelings of inadequacy are shared by 
most people 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. …I am disapproving and judgmental 
of my speech 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. …I am intolerant and impatient 
towards aspects of my speech I don’t 
like 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
91 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
Appendix B – Study 2  
 
Self-affirmation Manipulation – Phase 1 
 
This part of the study focuses on events experienced within particularly important domains 
and the effect that these events have…  
 
Consider the following values and rank them from least (12) to most (1) important: 
____ athletic ability 
____ being good at art 
____ belonging to a social group 
____ career 
____ creativity 
____ government or politics 
____ independence 
____ learning and gaining knowledge 
____ music 
____ relationships with family and friends 
____ sense of humor 
____ spiritual or religious values 
 
 
        Self-Affirmation Manipulation – Phase 2     
 
Self-Affirmation Standard Condition: 
 
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1). 
Think about a time when this important value was relevant in your life. 
 
• Briefly state 3 or 4 memorable experiences that pertain to this important value.  
• Describe the experience that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important 
to you. 
• Explain in full why this value is important. Identify your top two reasons why it’s 
important. 
 
Self-Affirmation Mistake Condition: 
 
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1). 
Think about a time when you made a horrible mistake pertaining to this important value. 
 
• Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this important 
value.  
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• Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to 
you. 





Consider your lowest ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12). 
Think about a time when you made a horrible mistake pertaining to this value. 
 
• Briefly state 3 or 4 times in which you made a mistake related to this value.  
• Describe the mistake that was most exceptional, influential to you, or important to 
you. 
• Explain in full why this value is important to others. Identify your top two reasons 




1) Looking back, how important to you is the value you chose to write about? 
Not at all 
self-critical 
     Extremely 
self-critical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2) In general, I try to live up to these values 
Not at all 
self-critical 
     Extremely 
self-critical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3) How self-critical were you when writing about your personal event?  
Not at all 
self-critical 
     Extremely 
self-critical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4) To what extent did you write about your personal event compassionately?  
Not at all 
compassionately 
     Extremely 
compassionately 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5) How positive was the event you wrote about?  
Not at all 
positive 
     Extremely 
positive 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6) How negative was the event you wrote about?  
Not at all 
negative 
     Extremely 
negative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
State Self-Compassion Scale (S-SCS) – study two 
Think about how you felt in this moment while discussing your experience related to 
an important value   
 














1 2 3 4 5 
2. …I am understanding and patient 
towards those aspects of myself I 
didn’t like during my experience  




1 2 3 4 5 
4. … I feel like most other people 
probably share these experiences 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. …I am trying to see my flaws as part 
of the human condition 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. … I am giving myself the caring I 
need 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. … I am trying to keep my emotions in 
balance 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. … I think about my inadequacies and 
feel alone in my failures 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. …I tend to obsess and fixate on 
everything that was wrong 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. … I am reminding myself that 
feelings of inadequacy are shared by 
most people 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. …I am disapproving and judgmental 
about my experience 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. …I am intolerant and impatient 
towards aspects of my speech I don’t 
like 






94 VALUES-AFFIRMATION AND SELF-COMPASSION 
 
Appendix C – Study 3 
     Self-Affirmation Manipulation – Phase 1     
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some 
of which may be unimportant. Please rank these values and qualities in order of their 
importance to you, from 1-13 (1 = most important item, 13 = least important item). Use 
each number only once.  
_____Artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation  
_____Sense of humor 
_____Relationships with friends/family 
_____Spontaneity/living life in the moment 









_____Other (please list:__________________)  
 
Phase 2 - Self-Affirmation Condition 
 
Consider your top ranked value (the value most important to you – ranked number 1).  
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    Phase 2 – Control Condition      
 
 
Consider your bottom ranked value (the value least important to you – ranked number 12). 
 
• Describe why you think this value might be important to somebody else. 
 
Manipulation Check 
Rate how much you agree with the following statement from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
 
1) The value I wrote about is very important to me. 
Not at all 
important 
     Extremely 
important 
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